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ABSTRACT
The traditional method of safeguarding nuclear facilities, nuclear material
accountancy (NMA), faces many challenges when applied to pyroprocessing facilities.
To aid in the safeguarding of these facilities, process monitoring (PM) is being
investigated as a complementary method to NMA. PM takes general process data, such as
density, current etc., and applies it to safeguards through the use of a statistical
framework. Signature Based Safeguards (SBS), a proposed statistical framework for the
application of PM techniques, identifies anomalous scenarios and subsequently identifies
and detects their respective PM signatures from a system of sensors. This work focuses
both on assisting SBS through identifying anomalous scenarios, and on the computer
modeling of these failure modes and the PM signatures for them. The anomalous
scenarios investigated were mechanical failure modes with potential safeguardssignificance as they could lead to the deposition of plutonium and other actinides in the
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final uranium product ingot. The signatures of these anomalous scenarios were primarily
radiation signatures from a coincidence counter that is used to analyze the final ingots.
Several different failure modes were identified for both the electrorefiner and the cathode
processor. The signatures for these failure modes were then determined by coupling two
separate computer models. The first model is a FORTRAN-based electrorefiner code
named ERAD capable of modeling the mass transport of metals within an electrorefiner.
The second model was an MCNP-based simulation of the Canberra JCC-31 High Level
Neutron Coincidence Counter. First, the identified failure modes were simulated by
changing ERAD inputs. ERAD calculated an elemental mass composition at the cathode
which was then used as the final ingot composition. The final ingot composition was
analyzed for single and double neutron coincidence count rates using the MCNP model.
The results demonstrate significant radiation signatures for the presence of plutonium as a
result of the electrorefiner failure modes. Signatures from cathode processor failure
modes were weak and thus warrant future investigation of better detectors for integration
into a SBS framework.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Electrochemical reprocessing, or pyroprocessing, is a proposed method for the
recycling of used nuclear fuel (UNF) [1]. Pyroprocessing utilizes electrochemistry to
separate uranium from UNF and consolidate it into a fuel form for utilization in a fast
metal reactor. Pyroprocessing is designed to treat fuels from both light water reactors
(LWR) and fast metal reactors. However, it is challenging to apply traditional nuclear
safeguard methods such as the mass tracking method, nuclear material accountancy
(NMA). New methods utilizing process monitoring (PM) are being developed to increase
confidence in NMA measurements [2]. One of these new proposed methodologies is
known as signature based safeguards (SBS) [3].
SBS aggregates signals from a pyroprocessing facility to determine whether or not
diversion of nuclear materials has occurred. Thus, determination of signals associated
with diversion scenarios and off normal operational that may lead to improper mass
tracking. Hence, false alarms must be investigated.
This thesis details extensive work into signature determinations and the conclusions.
This chapter provides an introduction to traditional NMA safeguards and PM-based
safeguards. In addition, pyroprocessing and its specific unit operations are also discussed.
Challenges in safeguarding pyroprocessing are detailed. Finally, Motivations for this
work are given, and the concluding paragraph outlines the organization of this thesis.
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1.1 SAFEGUARDS OVERVIEW
1.1.1 Safeguards Definitions

Safeguards are integral to the design and operation of any commercial nuclear
facility. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is
responsible for implementation and continuing inspection of safeguards, the definition of
safeguards is, “The timely detection of a diversion of significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear
material from peaceful nuclear activities” [4]. SQ refers only to nuclear materials
classified as special nuclear material (SNM) consisting of different materials with fissile
or fertile qualities. A table with the values of SQ for various SNM is depicted in Table 1
below.
Table 1- List of Significant Quantities and their Associated Special Nuclear Material [4]
SNM

SQ

Pu

8 kg

U-233

8 kg

HEU (U-235 > 20%)

25 kg U-235

LEU (U-235 < 20%)

75 kg U-235

Natural U

10 Mt

Depleted U

20 Mt

The

20 Mt
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Safeguard measurements are typically taken in the framework of a measurement
method known as NMA which utilizes a mass balance to determine the difference of
material coming into a facility versus the amount being removed. This mass balance is
illustrated by Equation 1 [2] below:
,

(1)

where MB is material balance, Iin is the inventory at the beginning of the process, Iout is
the inventory at the end of the process, Tin is inventory being transferred into the process,
and Tout is the inventory being transferred out of the process. Thus, proper accountancy
must occur at all points throughout a process. The goal is to ensure that the value of MB
is equal to 0 with a detection probability (DP) of loss equal to 0.95[2]. This goal is met
when the total uncertainty is less than the quotient of 1 SQ divided by 3.3.
The inability to meet these uncertainty requirements may lead to one of two
different kinds of errors. The first type of error is known as a type I error, which occurs
when measurements indicate that diversion has occurred when in fact it has not. This
happens in two different manners. The first is a false alarm, which is the first alarm raised
to indicate diversion at the safeguarded facility when it has not actually occurred [4]. The
second is a false positive, which is when the IAEA inspectors cannot verify whether or
not diversion occurred. These errors are particularly important as they hold up plant
throughput and are most sensitive to safeguards measurements with high uncertainties.
The second type of safeguard error associated with safeguarding a nuclear facility
is known as a type II error. This occurs when an alarm has failed to raise despite the fact
that diversion has occurred [4]. These errors have great safeguards implications, but have
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less impact on the overall throughput of a plant because the plant does not have an alarm
from which it is shutdown and investigated.
1.1.2 Challenges with NMA

Challenges with applying NMA arise from attaining the high level of statistical
confidence with the measurements being performed [2]. NMA is most effective when
applied to commercial facilities that transport and account for material in bulk forms.
This is because when materials are in bulk form they can be monitored and measured as
discrete units. As they are discrete units, seals and gross inventory counts of total number
of units can be used to monitor if material has been diverted. These discrete units of bulk
material include but are not limited to items such as new and UNF assemblies as well as
tanks of enriched UF6 gas [5]. These gross inventory measurements have been aided by
improved containment and surveillance techniques (C/S) and improved detection
technologies to determine if unauthorized alterations have been made to the bulk
material. These technologies include advanced seals and passive radiation detectors. With
these technologies, NMA can be applied with high accuracy within these facilities. NMA,
however, can face several challenges when applied to reprocessing facilities [1].
NMA faces difficulties when it is applied to reprocessing facilities, as the
confidence levels attained in the mass balances applied to these facilities do not meet the
required confidence set forth by the IAEA. This is because throughput is very high and
involves separation of plutonium from uranium in most cases that must be accounted for.
As the SQ of plutonium is low, the mass balance uncertainty must be low. For example,
if the uncertainty was to be as low as 0.3% and throughput of plutonium is large such as
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1000 kg during a balance period, the greatest diversion it could register with the required
confidence is 11.5 kg, which is still greater than 1 SQ and does not fulfill the IAEA
safeguards goals [2]. For this reason, measurement technologies that currently exist,
which cannot match the hypothetical 0.3%, cannot estimate masses of plutonium and
uranium in irradiated and reprocessed fuels to the necessary confidences and thus NMA
alone is not a valid method for safeguarding SNM.
These challenges with NMA when applied to reprocessing are evident in the case of
the Japanese reprocessing plant at Rokkasho [6]. The Rokkasho plant was one of the first
major aqueous reprocessing plants to be developed for commercial purposes that required
safeguards due to Japan being a member of the NPT. Due to the multiple process streams
and insensitive measurements, safeguarding the plant became a challenge and one that
delayed and complicated the construction of Rokkasho [6]. To demonstrate their facility
as being safeguardable, Rokkasho operators and engineers continually added
measurement and sampling technologies to the plant throughout its construction. These
new safeguards measures produced new complications for the operators monitoring the
facility to attain a material balance at any time needed [6]. Due to these safeguards
challenges and several engineering challenges, the Rokkasho plant has yet to become
operational.
1.1.3 PM and NRTA Overview

To address these challenges with applying NMA to reprocessing technologies, two
different approaches have been proposed [2][7]. These two approaches are known as
process monitoring (PM) and near real time accountancy (NRTA). Both of these
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approaches could be useful in increasing safeguards confidence for applications to
reprocessing technologies.
NRTA is an extension of the mass balance method common to NMA. It differs from
NMA, however, as the periods over which the mass balances occur are shorter. For
example, most statistical investigations, however, compare the differences between
annual and monthly mass balances [7]. Despite seemingly beneficial in concept, studies
by Avenhaus and Jausch demonstrated that for optimal operator protracted diversion of
nuclear material, the detection probability (DP) was greater for the annual balance
periods as opposed to the monthly ones [8]. However, further statistical studies on NRTA
utilizing Page’s joint sequential tests have demonstrated that NRTA can provide high DP
for abrupt diversion of SNM. The Page’s joint test studies also demonstrated DP’s of
protracted diversion that are higher than those attained by annual NMA balance
measurements but still may not be sufficient to attain the confidence required by the
IAEA [7]. Current modeling efforts have been made to model pyroprocessing for NRTA
and use joint Page’s test for analysis [1][7]. These analyses have demonstrated that
NRTA, if optimized with daily material balances, can provide the necessary confidence
in safeguards measurements. However, NRTA requires unattainably low (with current
mass measurement technologies) mass quantification uncertainties to attain the
measurement confidence required by the IAEA [1]. Thus, NRTA is not immediately
applicable to reprocessing facilities, but could be applied in the future. PM is a set of
additional methods for assisting safeguards. PM involves using process measurements to
determine if off normal operations indicative of material diversion are occurring. These
measurements also aid the facility in ensuring it is operating as intended from an
6

operations perspective. Typical PM measurements include basic quantities such as
temperature, masses and volume of materials, and radiation measurements [3]. These
measurements themselves do not inform safeguards but when placed within a statistical
architecture can be applicable. There are two major proposed methods for applying PM
data. The first is a pattern recognition-based approach [2][7] and the other is a systemcentric approach [2][3]. The system-centric approach is also known as SBS. The work of
this thesis assists in the further development and understanding of SBS.
PM can be applied to safeguards in one of three ways [2]. The first is where NMA is
utilized as the primary safeguards measure, with PM being used as a secondary measure
for performing tasks such as assisting in resolving alarms. The second is where PM is the
primary measure for taking material inventory and tracking. The final is where PM and
NDA operate with equal application to tracking inventory and the results of both are
utilized in reaching a conclusion. The methods for SBS discussed in this thesis were
investigated to perform in this final kind of assistance.
The pattern recognition approach involves taking data over time from process
monitoring techniques and applying sequential tests such as Page’s test to determine if
large diversions or changes in material quantity have occurred given a certain diversion
from the mean value between data points [2]. The Page statistic test has an alarm
threshold that above which a large diversion of material is indicated. This method has
shown that when combined with NMA, the DP of diversion of material is significantly
increased.
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SBS utilize a system of sensors and a data integration and interpretation (DII)
algorithms to determine if anomalous scenarios are occurring [3][9]. This is performed
through the collection of data throughout the process using sensors located at each unit
operation. These sensors vary in terms of type and use and some examples of these
sensors are seen in Table 2 [3]. These sensors are arranged within the SBS framework to
indicate exactly what is occurring at a given part of the plant at both an indicated time as
well as over a specified period of time. Each of these sensors registers data as being
either normal or off-normal. This data is labeled as signatures of either normal or offnormal operation. In the case of measurements such as density or temperature, the data
can be registered by the sensor as being off-normal in the forms of low or high. SBS
involves identifying what sequence of off-normal signals indicate anomalous operations
and thus register an alarm if they occur and the DII modules register the data as being
indicative of this sequence.
Table 2- Examples of PM Measurements as Applied to Electrochemical Reprocessing
Sensor Technology

Description

Gas mass flow meter

Volume of Oxygen gas released into off
gas system in oxide reduction

Electrical Power Supply

Coulombs of Electric Charge Passed in
Electrorefiner (Coulombs)

NDA

Dose of Product from Electrorefiner

Electronic Balance

Mass of Electrowinning product metal
(kg)

Double Bubbler

Density of Molten Salt (g/cm^3)

8

The framework of SBS involves several different modeled levels when it is
computationally simulated. The lowest layer is the modeling of each of the unit
operations in the process [9]. This layer models the transport of material in each unit
operation and can simulate discrete off normal operations [9]. The next level is the
sensors monitoring the operations. These sensors register the data and give it to the next
level of the framework, the DII analysis module for the given operation [9]. This module
then integrates the data for that given time period or event for that given operation to the
uppermost level of the framework, which is the system wide DII integrating the data for
each event from each of the operational modules. This uppermost DII module then makes
the decision to raise an alarm if an anomalous scenario has appeared to have occurred
from the integration of the event data or register the event as having occurred within the
parameters of normal operation [9].
Computational simulations for the SBS framework have historically been applied to
both pyroprocessing and aqueous reprocessing facility models. Anomalous scenarios and
the signal sequences are determined [3, 9] and then the simulation is run for a facility for
a given number of operational cycles over a prescribed time. During the simulation, there
are a fixed number of anomalous scenarios that occur. Each sensor has a pre-determined
probability of proper classification, misclassification, and misdetection. The system of
sensors is tuned to the prescribed anomalous scenarios and the simulation run. For the
case of perfect sensor health and prescribed anomalous scenarios, the DP of these
anomalous scenarios is very high [9]. However, the DP changes depending on the value
of these probabilities for the sensors. As the sensors became more uncertain, the total DP
reduced and the DII was assigned a metric known as the average normalized error
9

(ANE). The ANE is a measurement of the error of the DII to detect diversion. For various
anomalous scenarios, the ANE differs depending on the sensors involved. The ANE
when measured in some anomalous scenarios fell outside of the 95% confidence interval
[9]. In addition, the number of anomalies detected tends to be an overestimation leading
to an increased number of false alarms [9]. Both of these results are undesirable, but
could be improved through improved sensor technologies. With improved sensor
technology, these errors could be reduced and fall into the range that would be needed to
be properly applied as a complementary method to NMA.
Additional runs were made in which the probabilities and uncertainties of the
sensors were not changed, but some were assumed to fail [3]. In this case, an increased
false alarm probability was registered. This increased number of false alarms increased
with the number of sensors assumed to fail. Sensor health, uncertainty, and their ability to
identify signatures are of the upmost importance to the proper implementation of SBS.
1.1.4 Safeguard Implications of Process Failures

Though often thought as more of an operational concern, process failures throughout
a reprocessing facility also have potential resounding safeguards implications. Failure
modes in process equipment can lead to improper or insufficient transport of materials
within a process, which causes issues for mass tracking. Failure modes highlight the
problems of NMA with respect to reprocessing as it will most likely not be able to assess
the transit of mass with high enough accuracy and thus generate a false alarm. This false
alarm can develop further into a false positive error which is of even greater significance.
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Thus, understanding what failure modes can occur and their implications for generating
safeguards errors is important.

1.2 PYROPROCESSING OVERVIEW
1.2.1 Pyroprocessing History

Electrochemical separation of nuclear material is a process that has been known
and investigated for quite some time. The production of UO2 from molten UO2Cl2 using
electrochemistry was first discovered at the end of the 19th century [10]. After this
discovery, research into the development of electrochemical production of fuel was
performed primarily in the United States. Brookhaven National Lab (BNL), Los Alamos
National Labs (LANL), and Oak Ridge National Labs (ORNL) all lead early research in
separations of uranium from salt for fuel from their metal fuel reactors [10]. This salt
separations work gave rise to the current extraction process seen today. The first major
efforts to extract heavy metal from spent fuel in electrorefiner equipment occurred at
LANL in the early 1960s. This process utilized NaCl-KCl eutectic and was utilized to
extract 1.6 tons of high purity plutonium metal [10].
The most prominent work in early pyroprocessing is the work carried out by
Argonne National Lab (ANL) at their Idaho site [11]. The first efforts at ANL involved
the fuel of the EBR-II reactor whose fuel was processed via pyroprocessing in the mid to
late 1960s [11]. The other effort that led to the current understanding of pyroprocessing
was that to treat the fuel from the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR). This was the first instance
where a LiCl-KCl salt eutectic was used for the processing, the most common salt
eutectic in current designs [10]. The current electrorefining model involving a fuel basket
11

with a metal cathode that dendrites of uranium are transported to arose from this work
[10, 11].
Electrochemical reprocessing continues to progress in the United States at Idaho.
Pyroprocessing is used to treat metal blanket fuel resulting from EBR-II that is
significantly depleted uranium or natural uranium [11]. The Mark IV and Mark V
electrorefiner were designed for this purpose.
Internationally, electrochemical reprocessing is of the most interest to the
Republic of Korea (ROK). The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is
currently investigating pyroprocessing as the favored method with dealing with the back
end of the nuclear fuel cycle [12]. Much research has involved the design of the unit
operations of the pyroprocessing, and KAERI even generated its own engineering scale
demonstration facility [12]. This demonstration facility is known as the PyRoprocess
Inactive integrated DEmonstration (PRIDE) Facility and treats no actual UNF.
Japan and the European Union (EU) have also expressed significant interest in the
application of electrochemical reprocessing to the nuclear fuel cycle [10, 13]. In Japan,
the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) has been at the
forefront of pyroprocessing research. CRIEPI has developed its own electrorefining
capabilities to process actinides and has seen reasonable success [13]. CRIEPI looks to
continually develop pyroprocessing for the purpose of commercial use [13]. There exists
efforts throughout the EU to develop pyroprocessing capabilities; however, one project of
particular interest partners nine different countries with the purpose of developing
chemical separations of UNF. This project is known as the Actinide Recycling by
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Separation and Transmutation (ACSEPT) [14]. Like the other organizations already
discussed, the ASCEPT project has developed its own technological designs for
pyrochemical separations including its own electrorefiner design [14].
This history demonstrates that pyroprocessing is a popular subject of investigation
for the processing of UNF. For this reason, the development of safeguards should be
closely integrated with technological development and facility design as to prevent issues
similar to those at Rokkasho.
1.2.2 Pyroprocessing Description

Though there are many facility designs proposed for pyroprocessing, the basic
sequence of unit operations within them does not typically differ between them [15]. A
flow sheet of this sequence of operations for used oxide fuel is seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1- Pyroprocessing Flow sheet for Oxide Fuels
13

For a plant processing oxide fuel, the input is used fuel assemblies from
commercial light water reactors (LWR). These assemblies are chopped into smaller
pieces free of cladding and placed within a basket. This basket is lowered into an
electroreducer that contains a LiCl-KCl salt bath. Here, through electrochemical reactions
where the basket acts as the cathode and the salt acts as the anode, gaseous products
specifically oxygen as well as Cs/Sr is removed and transported out of the fuel. The Cs/Sr
is consolidated into its own waste form that can be tracked for the purpose of NMA
verification.
After removal from the electroreducer, the basket is then lowered into another salt
bath within an electrorefiner. Here, through electrochemical reactions where the basket
acts as the anode and there is a cathode present, uranium is transported from the basket
acting as an anode and deposited at a cathode in the form of dendrites. The active
products dissolve into the salt and the cladding and noble metals remain within the basket
itself. Both the cathode and the anodic product are left with salt entrained, and both
products are transported to processing equipment to have the salt distilled off. The
remains after salt distillation of the anode generate a metal waste form that is then
assessed, and the uranium metal forms its own consolidated fuel ingot that can be used in
later fabrication of fuel for use in a liquid metal reactor (LMR). The salt distilled off as
well as some remaining in the electrorefiner is then placed in a drawdown stage during
which lanthanides are removed and oxidant production occurs within the salt before
being returned to the ER. In addition, U/TRU products ingots form their own
consolidated ingot; however, the method by which the U/TRU product is recovered is
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still under debate as to whether or not to use a liquid cadmium cathode (LCC). By
inspecting the waste forms and consolidated ingots from each of these steps, one can
make conclusions about the mass throughput of a facility.

1.2.3 Safeguard Challenges associated with Pyroprocessing

There are multiple unique challenges associated with safeguarding
pyroprocessing. The first challenge is that, unlike an aqueous reprocessing facility, there
is no input accountability tank to take accurate measurements of the spent fuel inventory
after it has been delivered to the facility upfront [1]. This is due to the fact that
dissolution and separation of the fuel occur in the same step, i.e. in the electrorefiner, as
opposed to aqueous plants where the UNF is dissolved in one specialized dissolver tank
and the separations occurs in a separate chemical process tank that the dissolved fuel is
pumped into. In order to keep a proper mass balance, the input inventory must be a very
accurate measurement or else NMA will most likely not be able to measure with the
acceptable accuracy the total mass balance of the plant. To combat these issues with
NMA, three measurement schemes have been devised for the inventory. The first two
involve quantifying measurements of both UNF assemblies as well as measurements of
shredded fuel. Though these measurements are useful, the uncertainties of these
measurements are typically high and would likely be unacceptable in the framework of
NMA [1]. The other method proposed are measurements done to spent fuel power after a
process of voloxidation has occurred up front on the UNF assemblies [1]. This
voloxidation process would serve both as a method for removing volatile products and
tritium, but also as a type of input accountability tank except with powdered fuel instead
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of dissolved fuel. Research has demonstrated that this will most likely not be better in
terms of uncertainty, but new methodologies for measurement of the powder may reduce
the uncertainty.
The other major issue with safeguarding pyroprocessing that arises is in its
inability to have a plant flushout [1]. Plant flushouts occur when the entire plant is
shutdown and all material removed and measured thus effectively closing the material
balance and effectively determining whether or not diversion has occurred. In a
pyroprocessing plant, performing a flushout for the purpose of NMA is not feasible. This
is due to the sheer size of the pyroprocessing plants as well as the need to keep salt and
actinides in the electrorefiner so that the transport of actinides continues as their presence
in the salt is necessary for transport [1]. Removing products would reduce the throughput
and make a pyroprocessing facility significantly less efficient.
To address these issues, these new methodologies for aiding NMA such as NRTA
and PM have to be applied. How they may be applied and how effective they can be
requires further investigation. The motivation of this work comes from the need to
determine the applicability of PM to addressing pyroprocessing safeguards specifically
because of these challenges.

1.3 MOTIVATION AND APPROACH

1.3.1 Motivation for SBS Signature Identification

As discussed previously, SBS has demonstrated itself as a strong candidate for
implementing of PM methods into commercial facilities. To implement SBS into an
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actual commercial setting, identifying and modeling signatures is of the upmost
importance. This work looked to identify signatures with the ultimate goal of reducing
Type I safeguards errors. As discussed previously, operational failure modes can easily
lead to situations in mass transfer that could result in false alarms and, with it, false
positives. This work looked to reduce the false positive rate by identifying multiple
scenarios under which this type of false alarm could occur. This was achieved through a
process known as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) first developed by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) used for analyzing failure
modes and their effects [16]. FMEA performs its work in four steps. The first is to
identify the system boundary, which in the case of this work was the electrorefiner,
cathode processor, and final ingot casting stages and the associated sensors with it. The
second is to identify the boundary and describe each component in the boundary. The
third is to identify the potential failure modes. The fourth is to determine the probability,
severity, and risk of each potential failure mode [17]. This thesis covers the first three
steps and investigated the risk implications of the fourth step.
By being able to identify the failure modes, the signatures from the sensors
associated with these failure modes could be investigated. By knowing these signatures,
the ability to resolve false alarms would be increased as the DII would be better able to
indicate the reason the alarm and thus aid NMA in this resolution. This would in theory
significantly reduce the false positives encountered and thus allow the pyroprocessing
facility to operate with greater fluency and less safeguards risk.
Another motivation for signature identification also deals with the current
limitations and assumptions of the computational model. The current modeling efforts
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make assumptions about sensor uncertainty and health [3, 9]. By investigating signatures
and sensor modeling the actual ability for these sensors to misclassify or misdetect can be
quantified value thus lending to more accurate results from a system centric model. This
in turn could lead to the further demonstration of SBS as being an adequate PM-based
approach to aiding NMA in safeguarding pyroprocessing facilities. The work of this
thesis involves a computational effort to determine safeguards-significant signatures and
sensor characteristics for addressing these problems.

1.3.2 General Overview of Approach

As actual experiments and operations could not be performed on a commercial
scale, this work was performed through computer modeling. This was done by a loose
coupling of two separate computer codes. As this work focused on failure modes in the
ER and the subsequent cathode processor, a model and the assumptions for both was
developed. To simulate ER throughput, a computer code called Enhanced REFIN with
Anodic Dissolution (ERAD) was utilized to simulate mass transport in the ER during a
variety of operating conditions. These operating conditions changed depending on a
given failure mode analyzed. The cathodic product as result of the mass transport
calculation could then be analyzed by a subsequent simulation of a non-destructive assay
(NDA) detector to determine what radiation signatures may exist and with what
measurement uncertainty. There are many different advanced NDA instruments available
in the safeguards arena, ranging from passive gamma detectors to active neutron counting
methods. For this work, the modeled detector was the JCC-31 HLNCC, a LANL-
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developed, Canberra distributed detector for coincidence counting [18]. This detector was
modeled in MCNPx using tallies that allowed for the computation of expected singles
and doubles counts from the detector. These simulated counts provide the radiation
signatures of interest to be integrated into an SBS framework. This detector was selected
as it was heavily documented in the public literature as well as it bore great resemblance
to current NDA counting devices under investigation by KAERI for safeguarding SNM
[18, 19]. The weak coupling of these two codes provides key insights into these important
signatures for integration into an SBS framework.

1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
This document provides a comprehensive overview of the work undertaken in the
signature determination for failure modes determined for both electrorefining and for
cathode processing. It is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 provides an
extensive discussion of the technology of both the ER and the CP and discusses the
multiple different failure modes that were identified to be possible for both of these
technologies. Chapter 3 focuses on the computer models used and developed for both the
ER operation and radiation detection measurements of the final consolidated ingot.
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the methodology undertaken for the purpose of coupling
the two separate computer models. Chapter 5 provides the results of the signature
determination work for the ER failure modes. Chapter 6 provides the results of the
signature determination work for the determined CP failure modes. Finally, Chapter 7
provides a summary of the work, motivation, results, and final conclusions drawn.
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2. PYROPROCESSING EQUIPMENT FAILURE MODES
As discussed previously, pyroprocessing requires multiple steps that utilize
advanced process equipment. It is important from a systems perspective to note that none
of the complex process equipment designed for pyroprocessing is immune from
operational failure. For this reason, understanding the potential manners in which
equipment can fail and the overall impact of these failures is crucial for the successful
operation for an advanced system such as that of a pyroprocessing plant. Work has been
undertaken for this thesis to identify these potential failure modes and analyze their
consequences from a safeguards perspective. As process failures can potentially lead to
the production of signals that would indicate an alarm in a SBS framework,
understanding how to properly identify what failure may have occurred can help in
resolving the alarm and reducing the probability of Type I safeguard errors. Thus failure
modes with potential safeguards implications were analyzed in this work for
electrorefining and cathode processing[20]. This chapter discusses the equipment
involved in detail as well as the potential failure modes that were identified.

2.1 ELECTROREFINER FAILURE MODES
2.1.1 Electrorefiner Background

The electrorefiner is a critical stage of electrochemical reprocessing. During this
stage, uranium is separated from the chopped fuel for the purpose of producing a final
product ingot. Many designs have been developed for electrorefiners over the past 50
years. These many designs differ in key design aspects, but all operate under the same
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concepts and theory. Figure 2 depicts one of the most referenced designs along with the
labeling of many common parts of an ER, the Mark IV electrorefiner developed by
Argonne National Laboratory [11, 21].

Figure 2- Diagram of Mark-IV Electrorefiner [22]

Most designs of the pyroprocessing ER involve similar conventions and
operations. A bath of a eutectic salt, in all common designs LiCl-KCl, is heated by some
form of heating element exterior to the bath [12, 14, 21, 23]. In some designs, there is
cadmium pool below this salt bath. A fuel dissolution basket (FDB) with the dissolved
fuel to be processed is submerged into a salt bath as the first step of operating an
electrorefiner [12, 14, 21, 23]. This basket acts as an anode and is rotated by an agitator
housed in an assembly above the salt bath. A salt stirrer also rotates to generate
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movement of the salt [12, 14, 21, 23]. An electric current is passed through the electrolyte
within the electrorefiner that results in the transport of actinides into the salt with noble
metals remaining in the anode basket. With proper operation, the uranium product is
transported to the cathode where it is deposited on its surface. The other actinides should
remain in the salt; however, actinides in the anode basket near the interior of the mass of
shredded fuel may not electrolytically separate into the salt. In addition, depending on the
operating conditions and potential within the electrorefiner the other active products can
transport to the cathode. The cathode also rotates to generate a diffusion layer for mass
transport. The cathode differs in the material it is manufactured with between designs.
The ANL developed designs utilize a stainless steel cathode for their Mark-IV
electrorefiner and concentric stainless steel tubes for their Mark-V design [11, 21]. The
electrorefiner developed by KAERI utilizes multiple graphite rods [12, 24]. These
graphite rods are chosen as the dendritic cathode deposits fall off on their own into a
basket that collects them by vibrations of the cathode. CRIEPI’s ER utilizes a solid
stainless steel cathode tube [23]. These various cathodes rotate. This rotation occurs to
generate the diffusion layer for mass transfer to. The deposited product is then removed
from the surface of the cathode for processing. Again this differs depending on design.
ANL’s designs remove the cathode and then scrape the product off outside the ER
equipment [21]. CRIEPI’s scrapes using an in-situ scraper into a fuel basket at the bottom
of the ER [23]. KAERI’s design as stated before, if operating normally, allows for the
dendrites to fall off the cathode naturally.
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2.1.2 ER Failure Modes

By using this design information, failure modes that are both general for every
designed ER and failure modes specific to a given ER could be identified. The failure
modes determined were poorly characterized anodic feedstock, temperature variations
within the ER, change in rotational speed of electrodes and/or salt stirrer, decreased
electrode submersion depth, electrical shorting of the electrodes, and catching of
integrated cathode scraper. Further details are described in the following paragraphs.
Poorly characterized anodic feedstock is the result of a misunderstanding of the
composition of the UNF within the anodic basket. The composition of the salt and what
species dissolve into it are heavily affected by the input composition. Accurate mass
measurements are challenging and there are high uncertainties associated with these
measurements (typically greater than 5% in magnitude [1]). Most initial fuel estimations
are a result of computer burnup programs; however, these programs posses bias that
makes them difficult to apply to an actual commercial facility. If the composition of the
anode and salt is difficult to characterize and differs significantly from what is expected,
the species dissolved into the salt and deposited at the cathode are affected. In addition,
the necessary operating conditions of the ER are affected. A higher actinide concentration
in the salt can lead to co deposition of TRU at the cathode depending on the operating
conditions. For this reason, measurements of both the salt and chopped fuel are
continuously being evaluated to gain better accuracy of UNF compositions [1].
The initial composition of the feedstock can also be altered due to incomplete
oxide reduction in the electroreducer for the case of chopped ceramic fuels. The presence
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of oxygen will make it challenging for the eutectic to oxidize the fuel thus causing more
actinides to remain in the anodic basket and be transferred to the metal waste form. This
transference to the location where it is not supposed to be makes safeguards through
NMA challenging.
Temperature variations in the ER could be the result of several different failure
modes. The first is the failure of one or multiple heating elements in the ER vessel wall.
Another is a loss of onsite power that causes the heating elements in the ER to cease to
operate. A final manner in which this could occur is due to asymmetric heating where one
heating element is providing a greater temperature of heating compared to a different
heating element in a different portion of the ER vessel. Temperature variations are
significant failure modes as it alters the fundamental parameters required by the
chemistry of electrorefining such as the diffusivity and solubility of ionic species. In
addition, it affects the thermodynamic and kinetic aspects of the reactions within the ER
at the electrodes. If these fundamental chemical processes change, the compositions of all
three portions of the ER (anode, salt, and cathode) will be different than what was
predicted thus adding to challenges in mass tracking.
Change in rotational speed of the electrode would be the result of a failure of the
motor rotating the electrode, a failure of the agitator device causing the rotation, or a loss
of power for the supply of the motor itself for any of the electrodes. A change in
electrode speed is important to understand as it would affect the diffusion layer thickness
for transport. This in turn would alter the current, rate of oxidation and/or reduction of the
species in the electrorefiner. This change could lead to active species besides uranium to
deposit at the cathode, which would provide challenges with mass tracking of materials in
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pyroprocessing. If the salt stirrer rotation changes for similar reasons as the electrodes,
the homogeneity of the salt in the ER is compromised and this could result in uneven
deposition at the cathode.
A decreased electrode submersion depth occurs as a result of either a sticking or
jamming of the electrode equipment or a lower than normal salt bath level in the ER due
to removal and insufficient replacement of salt from the ER during the drawdown and
oxide productions stages. A decreased electrode submersion depth results in a lower
surface area, which affects the effective surface area of the electrode. This affects mass
transfer, the total current density, and the reactions rate of the species in the ER.
The electrical shorting of the electrodes is due to the reduced uranium product
forming as dendrites on the cathode. This has the potential to produce electrical shorting
paths. This is a failure mode that has been observed at the Mark IV reactor at INL for the
portion between the anode basket and the ER vessel equipment [25]. This electrical
shorting will lead to deposition of U/TRU at locations in the ER other than the cathode
such as the vessel wall. This provides challenges when trying to safeguard material via
mass tracking. In addition, the efficiency of the ER is affected and thus it becomes an
operations issue as well. Thus, proper monitoring of an ER during operations and proper
scraping of the cathode is a must.
The failure mode of the catching and subsequent jamming of an integrated
cathode scraper only applies to ERs that feature an in-situ scraper such as the one present
in the CRIEPI design [23]. The mechanism that scrapes the dendrites off the cathode has
the potential to catch on the growing deposits thus stopping the deposit of dendrites into
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the in-situ dendrite basket and affecting operational parameters. This will affect the
surface area, which changes the rates of reaction at the electrodes as well as the current
density, which results in similar safeguard challenges to the other failure modes where
co-deposition occurs as mass movement is not as expected.

2.2 CATHODE PROCESSOR FAILURE MODES

2.2.1 Cathode Processing Background

Cathode processing is the step immediately following the electrorefiner. In this
step the dendritic product from the ER cathode is processed so that the salt left entrained
in it from the ER is removed. The remaining product is then consolidated into a metal
ingot for future fuel fabrication. This is done by a two step process. The first step
involves the uranium dendrites being placed within a process crucible with the salt
entrained. This product is then distilled in a high temperature, air evacuated environment
so that the salt from the ER is removed and the dendritic products remains. This
distillation can occur due to the difference in vapor pressures between the salt and the
metal product. After this the second step occurs, the dendritic product is then heated to a
high temperature and melted into a consolidated ingot.
This two step process has been generated two major designs of note. The first
process created by ANL combines both steps into the same process equipment [26]. A
diagram of this piece of equipment is seen in Figure 3. The other design is that designed
at KAERI [27]. This separates the two steps into two separate pieces of equipment.
Distillation occurs in a distillation column, while the ingot consolidation has its own
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melting and pouring equipment for the ingot fabrication. A computer rendered image of
the design of the ingot consolidation equipment is in Figure 4.

Figure 3- Diagram of ANL's Cathode Processing Equipment Design [26]
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Figure 4- Diagram of KAERI's Ingot Consolidation Equipment [27]

2.2.2 CP Failure Modes

Several different failure modes have been identified both for the distillation step
and the consolidation and ingot casting step. These failure modes are for the most part the
same for either design. These failure modes include poorly characterized feedstock for
both steps in the process, temperature variation failure modes that applies to both steps in
the process, pressure variations in the distillation process, and holdup of dendritic
feedstock for KAERI’s ingot consolidation device. An in-depth description of these
failure modes is expanded in this section.
The failure mode of poorly characterized feedstock in the distillation process is a
result of the difficulty with determining the associated composition of the cathode
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product. This can have several implications. The entrained salt is the greatest cause of
these implications. It has been found that at the conditions associated with distillation that
PuCl3 can react with the U metal and cause Pu metal to remain in the final product ingot
[26]. This presence of creates difficulties in taking accurate measurements of a
consolidated ingot for safeguard measurements. In addition, presence of zirconium in the
cathode product, which has the potential to be transported in the electrorefiner, could
change the form the dendrites take when scraped and placed into the process crucible thus
causing difficulties with distillation. Improper distillation will lead to the presence of salt,
which contains active products which will cause problems for mass tracking and
safeguard measurements for the same reasons stated before as Pu is present.
Poorly characterized feedstock occurs in the ingot fabrication process as a result
of uncertainty on the cathode product and whether or not salt is still present in the
cathode product after distillation. The composition of the dendritic product can affect the
homogeneity and melting point as this is composition-dependent and materials of
different density can lead to heterogeneity. Entrained salt will remain in a heterogeneous
ingot. The active species present in the salt in the heterogeneous ingot again will cause
problems for safeguards measurements.
Temperature variations in the salt distillation process can occur due to a partial or
complete failure of the heating mechanism, in these cases an induction coil, as well as
broken thermocouples. This is important to note as the temperature of distillation is
critical to the CP’s operation. At a temperature lower then what may be needed to distill
off the salt in the dendrites will lead to salt being left entrained in the dendrites before it
is melted into an ingot that results in a heterogeneous ingot.
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Temperature variations in the ingot consolidation and melting furnace can fail due
to failure of heating elements or loss of power just like the ER or distillation process. If
the heating element is to fail, the high temperature required to melt and consolidate the
ingot will extremely difficult to achieve. This could lead to a heterogeneous ingot, which
has the same implications discussed previously.
Pressure variations in the distillation process can occur as a result of the failure of
the vacuum pump or the air seal keeping the atmospheric gas out. This is important as the
nominal pressure of the distillation process is 100 Pa to produce the separation of vapor
pressures necessary for distillation [26]. This can lead to incomplete distillation, which
produces the same challenges associated with heterogeneity discussed before.
The final failure mode only applies to the KAERI design and this is the failure of
the feedstock delivery holdup mechanism. The feedstock delivery mechanism delivers
dendrites continuously to the melting crucible of the ingot consolidator. The dendrites are
delivered through an orifice that leads the mechanism into the melting crucible. This
orifice has the potential to become jammed or congested thus restricting the delivery of
dendrites. This would thus reduce the amount of dendrites being melted and thus reduce
the mass of the U product ingots. This reduced product ingot would in turn lead to a
smaller mass registered for the purpose of material accountancy thus having important
safeguards implications as the mass registered would be less than the input disturbing the
material balance.
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3. MODELS
The modeling of the various signatures was performed in this work through the
weak coupling of two different computer codes. The first was a code called Enhanced
REFIN with Anodic Dissolution (ERAD) [28, 29, 30] that modeled the ER. The second
code that it was coupled to was a MCNPx model of a non destructive assay instrument
known as a JCC-31 High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter (HLNCC) [18]. This
chapter describes the theory and computational background of these specific models.

3.1 ERAD
ERAD is a one dimensional computer code that models the electrorefiner in
pyroprocessing. This model assumes that there is uniform potential at the cathode, anode,
and homogenous salt bath. ERAD allows for the variation of several different inputs.
These inputs include the composition of the anode and salt bath, the elements to be
transported, and the operating parameters such as current, electrode surface area, time
steps of operation. By utilizing these input parameters, ERAD calculates, for the inputted
operation of the electrorefiner, the current for each element, the electrode potential, and
the composition of the salt, anode, and cathode in terms of weight percentage and total
mass of each element.
ERAD solves for these values through the use of three major calculations. The
first of these calculations is the Nernst equation, which solves for the equilibrium
potential of each element. The Nernst equation is seen in equation 2[29, 30]:

,
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(2)

where Eeq,j is the equilibrium potential,

is the standard reduction potential of species j,

R is the universal gas constant, T is the cell temperature,

is the number of electrons

transferred for the reaction of species j, F is Faraday's constant, and

and

are the

activities of the reduced and oxidized form of species j respectively in the salt.
The second equation that ERAD solves is the Butler-Volmer equation, which
calculates the rate at which a given element will be oxide or reduced. The Butler Volmer
equation is seen in equation 3[29, 30],
,

where

is the current of species ,

transfer coefficient,

(3)

is the standard exchange current density,

is the electrode surface area, and

is the

is the activation overpotential.

The final major calculation is the solution of the Nernst-Plank equation to
calculate the mass transfer rate of each nuclide in the ER. The Nernst-Plank equation is
seen in equation 4[29, 30],
,
where

is concentration in mol/cm3, inside all diffusion layers,

coefficient in the electrolyte,
absolute temperature,

is the charge of the ion,

(4)
is the diffusion

is the gas constant,

is Faraday’s constant, x is position, and

is

is the potential

gradient. For more information on ERAD and its theory see the references [28, 29, 30].
ERAD was compiled and run on a Windows 8 operating system using the open source
compiler “g95”. A sample of an ERAD script is provided in Appendix A.
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3.2 NDA MODEL
For the purpose of determining radiation signatures, a model was developed of the
JCC-31 HLNCC in several iterations of the Monte Carlo N-particle Code (MCNP). The
JCC-31 is a neutron coincidence counter developed by Los Alamos and distributed by
Canberra [18]. The JCC-31 consists of a cylindrical sample chamber with an air
environment surrounded by a polyethylene moderator. Within the polyethylene
moderator are embedded 18 separate He-3 detectors. The sample chamber walls and the
detector walls are lined with a thin layer of cadmium to shield from background and to
prevent moderated neutrons from returning to the sample chamber and inducing fissions
in the sample. The sample for analysis in the case of this work is the metallic fuel ingot
consolidated from the dendrites of the metal transported in the ER. This ingot is placed at
the center of the sample chamber and is counts a passive source of neutrons. A plot of the
JCC-31 from the MCNP plotter is seen in Figure 5.
The He-3 tubes passively register these counts in a coincidence circuit. In a
coincidence circuit, a neutron absorbed in any of the He-3 tubes is registered starting a
predelay. In the case of the JCC-31, the predelay is 4 microseconds. After this pre-delay
ends, a time gate of 64 microseconds is opened, and the total number of neutrons are
counted. If only one neutron enters during this time gate then a single count is registered,
if two neutrons enter a doubles count is registered as well as two singles counts. This
leads to the determination of two separate rates of interest: the singles rate and the
doubles rate.
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Figure 5- Top Down and Axial Cross Sections of JCC-31 HLNCC
These coincidence counts, as they are commonly called, can be simulated in
MCNPx using the ft8 CAP tally [31]. This tally allows for the specification of the given
predelay and time gate. These simulations for the determination of the coincidence count
rates were performed on an Intel i7 processor with a Windows 8 operating system.
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4. MODELING AND SIMULATION METHODOLOGY
To determine equipment sensors and radiation signatures through computer
modeling, a loose coupling of the two previously described codes was performed. These
codes were coupled by taking the output of the ERAD model and inputting it in the
MCNP detector model. This chapter describes how these two were coupled using burnup
data. In addition, this chapter describes the particular studies performed to determine
radiation signatures in terms of the different inputs and outputs of both ERAD and the
detector model.

4.1. COUPLING OVERVIEW
The coupling of the two codes was dependent on the type of failure mode being
analyzed. There were two different basic methodologies that are similar in that they each
have five steps but are different in terms of key inputs. The first methodology was for the
case of ER failure modes and the second was for failures in the CP.
The methodology for failure modes in the ER involved five major steps. The first
step was changing the input of ERAD to represent the failure mode of interest. After the
input was changed, ERAD was run to calculate the compositions and potentials of the
electrodes and salt. The cathode composition, which is in terms of elemental weight
percentage, was converted into a composition of isotopic weight percentages for each
element. This conversion was performed by applying weight percentages from a run of
ORIGEN-ARP for 45000 MWd/MTIHM in a PWR for a 3 year cycle with 25 years
cooling time [32]. This assumes that the isotopic weight percentages stay constant
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throughout pyroprocessing, the only thing that changes and needs to be tracked is the
elemental. These isotopic weight percentages were inputted into a homogenous
cylindrical ingot at the center of the sample chamber of the JCC-31 model in MCNP. The
code is then run with the homogeneous ingot outputting both singles and doubles counts
from which their rates can be derived. A flow sheet of this methodology is seen in Figure
6.

Figure 6- ER Failure Modes SBS Analysis Methodology Flow sheet

For the cathode processor failure modes a similar methodology was used. First the
inputs into ERAD were changed to perform transport that would only allow uranium
deposition at the cathode. ERAD was then run to calculate the composition and potential
at the cathode and in the salt. The salt composition and the cathode composition were
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then analyzed using the same burnup data as the ER study to convert the actinides in the
cathodic product and salt to isotopic composition. The salt eutectic elemental weight
percentages were converted to isotopic composition using the natural isotope atomic
percentages from data from the Chart of the Nuclides [33]. Using these isotopic
compositions a heterogeneous ingot was formed. This ingot consisted of two cylindrical
layers. The first layer was the cathodic product and the second layer was the salt left
entrained. The cathodic product layer was directly below the salt layer. This
heterogeneous ingot was then analyzed by the JCC-31 in MCNP for singles and doubles
counts from which their respective rates could be derived. This methodology is seen in
Figure 7.

Figure 7- CP Failure Modes SBS Analysis Methodology Flow sheet
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Details of the specific inputs and burnup data for these studies are documented in the
subsequent sections.

4.2 ERAD METHODOLOGY
The inputs of ERAD differed depending on the failure mode to be analyzed. The
failure modes analyzed were the poorly characterized anodic feedstock, reduction in
cathodic surface area due to jamming of equipment, change in current due to electrical
shorting, and change in diffusion layer thickness due to change in rotational speed of the
electrode. The first three of these failure modes were analyzed using their own dedicated
ERAD input test matrix. The change in electrode rotation speed and thus diffusion layer
thickness had its own test matrix. The test matrix of inputs for the first three failure
modes is seen in Table 3.
Table 3- Test Matrix for Poorly Characterized Anodic Feedstock, Reduced Electrode
Surface Area, and Change in Current
Run
i-1
i-2
i-3
i-4
i-5
i-6
i-7
i-8
i-9
i-10
i-11
i-12

Applied
Current (A)
72
72
72
11.5
11.5
11.5
85
85
85
30
30
30

Cathode
Area (cm2)
800
300
150
800
300
150
800
300
150
800
300
150

Current Density
(A/cm2)
0.090
0.240
0.480
0.0144
0.0383
0.0767
0.106
0.283
0.567
0.0375
0.100
0.200
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Initial Pu/U
salt mole ratio
0.030705
0.030705
0.030705
0.14827
0.14827
0.14827
0.336838
0.336838
0.336838
1.62658
1.62658
1.62658

As demonstrated in the Table, there are 12 different runs over four different
groups of currents and initial Pu/U ratio. By comparing results within a group, one can
see the effect of changing cathode surface area and thus current density. By comparing
between the four groups, one can see the impact of initial salt composition and changes in
currents on overall mass transported and its effects in off normal scenarios.
The test matrix developed for the changes in the diffusion layer thickness due to
changes in electrode rotation speed are seen in Table 4. These values were taken from a
CFD study in the open literature for electrorefiner modeling [24]. As can be seen the
study demonstrates the affects of the change of diffusion layer thickness primarily but
also allows for the demonstration of the effects of current density and salt composition
changes as well.
Table 4- Test Matrix for Study of the Variation of Diffusion Layer Thickness
Run
δ-1
δ-2
δ-3
δ-4
δ-5
δ-6
δ-7
δ-8
δ-9
δ-10

Applied Current
Density (A/cm2)
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.0275
0.0275
0.0275
0.0275
0.0275

Diffusion Layer
Thickness, δ (μm)
200
210
220
230
240
150
200
250
300
350

Initial Pu/U salt
mole ratio
0.337
0.337
0.337
0.337
0.337
1.627
1.627
1.627
1.627
1.627

For the final case of the cathode processing failure modes, the test matrix was simply
runs i-1, i-4, i-7, and i-10 from Table 4. This is because the primary concern is not the
contents of the ingot; it is the composition of the salt, which will be inputted into the final
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ingot. Thus the only thing to vary is the initial mass of entrained salt, which is altered in
its own test matrix governed by the input of the MCNP analysis.

4.3 CONVERSION OF ELEMENTAL COMPOSITION TO ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION

As stated in the coupling overview, the elemental composition in terms of weight
percent was converted to isotopic weight percentages for the purpose of input into the
MCNP model of the HLNCC. This was performed by multiplying the elemental weight
percentages by the isotopic weight percentages and coding it in MCNP as one
homogenous ingot or heterogeneous ingot with salt layer depending on the failure mode
analyzed. The data from the ORIGEN-ARP run for this conversion is seen in Table 5.

Table 5- Uranium and Plutonium Isotopic Compositions Calculated in ORIGEN for Input
into Detector Model
Uranium
Isotope

Weight
Fraction

Plutonium
Isotope

Weight
Fraction

U232

2.504E-09

PU236

1.95E-12

U233

1.91E-08

PU237

0.00E+00

U234

3.65E-04

PU238

3.48E-02

U235

9.02E-03

PU239

6.399E-01

U236

6.42E-03

PU240

1.82E-01

U237

2.00E-11

PU241

2.25E-02

U238

9.84E-01

PU242

1.21E-01

U239

0.00E+00

PU243

4.56E-17

PU244

1.3E-05
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4.4 MCNP MODEL METHODOLOGY
After the isotopic composition was determined, the ingot could be programmed
into MCNP for the purpose of being analyzed by the simulated detector. The entries into
MCNP for the geometry, materials, and sources of each run differed depending on the
type of failure mode being analyzed.
For ER failure modes, the ingot analyzed was that of a homogenous metal ingot
with the composition representative of the cathodic product with no salt left entrained.
The ingot was modeled as a cylinder whose height was twice that of the diameter. The
exact volume could be determined by using equation 5 to solve for the density and the
dividing the total mass by the density.
,

where

and

(5)

are the mass fraction and density of species j, respectively. The source

for the ER failure modes was dependent on the composition of the ingot and was
calculated by hand using data from the Chart of the Nuclides.
The source for ER failure modes was modeled as being spontaneous fission as
there were no low atomic mass elements to produce alpha-n reactions. ER detector
analyses were analyzed using MCNPx-POLIMI for their advanced specific spontaneous
fission sources [34]. MCNPx-POLIMI allows for specification of isotopes of spontaneous
fission and this specification defines the source term. The isotopes specified in the case of
the ER failure modes were the U-238 and Pu-240 isotopes and the source was evenly
distributed probabilistically over the entire ingot. By calculating the source strength, the
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amount of fissions from a given nuclide can also be determined and the fraction of the
total source from these two specific isotopes for the ER analyses can be computed. This
fraction and these specific fractions were inputted into the specialized source terms
allowing for the computation. The total number of spontaneous fissions divided by the
number of source fissions provides the total counting time. This total counting time is
important as it provides the basis for the count rate when dividing the tally results by the
total time of counting. The number of these source fissions runs differed to produce low
MCNP tally uncertainties.
The ingot for the case of the CP failure modes was modeled as a two layered
heterogeneous ingot, one of the metallic cathode product and one of the salt left
entrained. The metallic portion followed the same geometry guidelines as the ER ingot
for the metallic cathodic product in that it was a cylinder of twice the height as the
diameter. The salt layer then was the same diameter, but its height differed depending on
the weight percentage of salt left entrained. The test matrix of the CP failure modes
involved analyzing this weight percentage for 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 3.0, and 5.0 weight percent of
salt entrained. An example of an MCNP script for the ER failure modes is seen in
Appendix B.
The source term of the CP failure separated ingot was evenly distributed over the
salt layer. This was because the metallic product was entirely uranium and thus not very
active comparatively to the entrained salt that contained both alpha-n neutron reactions
that produced a neutron source and spontaneous fission neutrons. The script was
programmed for use in MCNP6. This was due to its newly released status at the time and
its updated data and multiprocessing capabilities. To simulate the source of neutrons from
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the salt two separate MCNP scripts were developed. The first script handled neutron
sources that came from alpha-n neutron reactions while the second handled neutrons
coming from spontaneous fissions. This source was determined by using the software
SOURCES-4C developed by Texas A&M in conjunction with Los Alamos National Labs
[35]. SOURCES-4C requires the composition and concentration of the actinides and low
mass nuclides that will produce alpha-n reactions to be inputted. Running SOURCES-4C
with the calculated composition and concentrations from ERAD and the burnup data, the
code calculated the probabilistic energy distribution and both alpha-n neutron and
spontaneous fission source rates. The spontaneous fission script was generated by placing
the command “PAR=SF” in the source definition portion of the MCNP script. The alphan script was generated by inputting the calculated probabilistic energy distribution using
an ERG card. These two scripts were run for the time required for 1 million source
spontaneous fissions to occur. Thus, the alpha-n source script always required more
source particles than the spontaneous fissions as more alpha-n neutrons were emitted per
second than there were source spontaneous fissions. An example of the alpha-n source
script is seen in Appendix C. An example of the spontaneous fission source MCNP script
is seen in Appendix D.
The MCNP tallies in each case used were ft8 CAP tallies [31]. These tallies
simulate coincidence counting and allow for the calculation of singles and doubles counts
and its rates. The detector was also assumed to be properly shielded from background
thus making so all counts registered come from the ingot itself. For the case of the CP
failure modes, the rates from both the spontaneous fission and alpha-n script were added
to calculate the total rates. The ER failure modes just involved the results of their
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particular script. In the calculation of each script, the estimated detector uncertainty of the
result calculated was reflect an actual detector as the capture tally involved completely
analog Monte Carlo with no variance reduction. In the case of the CP failure modes, the
total uncertainty of the combined sum involved propagating the uncertainty from the
results of both scripts. The squares of each total uncertainty were added and a square root
was taken [36]. This provided the total uncertainty of the combined rate.

4.5 TREATMENT OF CURIUM
Neutron measurements of spent fuel for mass determination and other safeguards
purposes are normally dominated by the presence of Cm-244, an isotope that is a strong
source of spontaneous fission neutrons. It has been often assumed that curium and
plutonium track each other throughout the pyroprocessing system with a constant ratio of
masses [37]. The tracking of curium counts has been proposed as a method for
safeguarding nuclear material for this reason. The rationale for this is the assumptions
made in relation to their thermodynamic and electrochemical properties. The most
relevant property being the Gibb’s free energy which is -64 kcal/mol for CmCl3 and -62.4
kcal/mol for PuCl3[38]. The standard reduction potentials differ however, thus
demonstrating that there should be a certain level of segregation of the two species
occurring in electrochemical cells such as the electrorefiner. Still, even if the segregation
occurs, the Cm-244 present in a final product will be the dominant source of neutron
making it impossible to produce an accurate mass determination measurement for
plutonium.
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To address these issues with the presence of curium, a method known as Residual
Actinide Recovery (RAR) has been developed by KAERI [12]. This process involves
adding CdCl2 to the salt in the ER to re-oxidize the curium and remove it from the final
product as seen by the chemical equation in equation 6:
(6)
This process will also oxidize plutonium and uranium that has attached itself to the
cathode, but the effect should be minimal comparatively to that of the curium. Any
electrochemical unit operation not employing this process would most likely result in
deposition of curium and thus produce a neutron source that is nearly 100% Cm-244 in a
pure metallic ingot. For the purpose of this study, the process was assumed to be
employed and was used to remove curium from any final metallic product analyzed thus
only even uranium and plutonium isotopes could contribute to the source. For salt
entrained studies however, such as the CP failure modes, the salt was assumed to
maintain the ratio of curium to plutonium derived from the burnup data of .00308.
For an anomalous scenario identification method such as SBS this removal of
curium may cause unnecessary difficulties. The presence of curium would produce a
strong neutron source that could be detected with little difficulty by any neutron detector
used to analyze it. By removing the curium, this advantage in detecting an anomalous
scenario would be lost. Thus, if SBS is to be implemented in the future in an actual
facility, then removal of actinides will most likely not want to be performed as to lose
this significant advantage. However, the analyses in this thesis are for the much more
challenging case to detect in which RAR is applied.
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5. RESULTS OF ER FAILURE MODE ANALYSES
Results from both ERAD and the MCNP model were determined to indicate
signatures for SBS as applied to pyroprocessing. This chapter consists of three sections.
The first discusses the results and analyses of signatures seen from ERAD. The second
presents the results and analyses of the results determined by the MCNP detector model
for the radiation signatures from the final metallic product[39, 40]. The last section
provides a short discussion of the detector uncertainty derived from the MCNP model
and its implications with regards to SBS.

5.1 RESULTS FROM ERAD
5.1.1 Current Density and Salt Composition Study Results

The results for the first test matrix where changes were made to the current
density and initial concentrations of plutonium and uranium are seen in Table 6. As can
be seen, the current density and the cathode surface area can vary significantly before it
exceeds the limiting current density and leads to the deposition of plutonium. Thus, a
significant jamming of the electrode would be needed for this deposition to occur. In
addition, as expected, with increased current, the mass of total material deposited
increases. Finally, with a higher initial ratio of Pu/U, we see that the quantity of
plutonium deposited comparatively to the uranium deposited increases significantly. This
illustrates the continuing importance of ensuring that the salt in the electrorefiner has
been treated to remove active products during periods of operation and these actinides
being placed in their own dedicated waste form as illustrated in the previous flow sheet.
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Table 6- Current Density Test Matrix (Table 3) Results for Cathodic Deposition from
ERAD

Run
i-1
i-2
i-3
i-4
i-5
i-6
i-7
i-8
i-9
i-10
i-11
i-12

Current
Density
(A/cm2)
0.090
0.240
0.480
0.0144
0.0383
0.0767
0.106
0.283
0.567
0.0375
0.100
0.200

Initial Pu/U
salt mole
ratio
0.030705
0.030705
0.030705
0.14827
0.14827
0.14827
0.336838
0.336838
0.336838
1.62658
1.62658
1.62658

U Mass
Deposited
(g)
5120
5120
5020
817
817
765
6040
6040
5440
2130
2060
1170

Pu Mass
Deposited
(g)
1.00E-07
1.00E-07
98.3
1.00E-07
1.00E-07
52.6
1.00E-07
1.00E-07
608
1.00E-07
74.6
970

Total Mass
Deposited
(g)
5120
5120
5118.3
817
817
817.6
6040
6040
6040
2130
2130
2130

The effect of cathode surface area on cathode potential is seen in Figure 8. As can
be seen, the potential increases in the case of a reduced surface area where transport of
plutonium occurs. In addition, a change in surface area of any kind produces a change in
potential. This can be used as a potential signature to be integrated into a SBS framework
through the use of a reference electrode in the ER to measure the potential.

Figure 8- Effect of Cathode Surface Area on the Cathode Potential Profile
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5.1.2 Diffusion Layer Thickness Study Results

The results of the second test matrix for the diffusion layer thickness study are
seen in Table 7. As demonstrated by the table, only slight variations in the diffusion layer
thickness are required for plutonium transport to occur in the ER. Thus, ensuring that the
ER is operating at the prescribed electrode rotation speed is important. If it is not
operating at the correct speed, then the deposition of plutonium will most likely raise an
alarm in a SBS framework indicating diversion that may be difficult for a safeguards
agency such as the IAEA to diagnose.

Table 7- Diffusion Layer Thickness Test Matrix (Table II) Results for Cathodic
Deposition from ERAD

Run
δ-1
δ-2
δ-3
δ-4
δ-5
δ-6
δ-7
δ-8
δ-9
δ-10

Applied Current
Density (A/cm2)
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.0275
0.0275
0.0275
0.0275
0.0275

Diffusion Layer
Thickness, δ
(μm)
200
210
220
230
240
150
200
250
300
350

Initial Pu/U
salt mole
ratio
0.337
0.337
0.337
0.337
0.337
1.627
1.627
1.627
1.627
1.627

U Mass
Deposited
(g)
7104.5
6737.6
6510.6
6278.9
6070.0
1563.1
1397.9
1145.6
978.7
855.3

Pu Mass
Deposited
(g)
0.0
370.3
599.2
832.8
1043.4
0.0
166.5
420.9
589.2
713.6

The effect of change in diffusion layer thickness on the cathode potential is seen
in Figure 9. Like with the changes in surface area, there is an increased negative potential
with an increase in diffusion layer thickness. However, for small perturbations in
diffusion layer thickness, the change in potential is not significantly large even though the
amount of plutonium deposited is. Thus, integrating this signal into SBS and being able
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to determine that this failure mode has occurred will be more challenging than
determining that the failure mode has occurred for the signal from change in cathode
surface area due to the need to define what a standard acceptable operating range of
potentials is for an ER.

Figure 9- Effect of diffusion layer thickness on cathode potential

5.2 RESULTS FROM DETECTOR MODEL
5.2.1 Current Density and Salt Composition Study Results

Using the results for the first test matrix for changes in current density and initial
concentration in the salt, the spontaneous fission rate and individual contribution from a
given element could be calculated. The results of these calculations are seen in Table 8.
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Table 8- Contribution of Uranium and Plutonium to the Overall Spontaneous Fission
Rates for Current Density Test Matrix (Table 3)

Run
i-1 & i-2
i-3
i-4 & i-5
i-6
i-7 & i-8
i-9
i-10
i-11
i-12

%
%
Contribution Contribution
by U
by Pu
100
0
0.4
99.6
100
0
0.1
99.9
100
0
0.7
99.3
100
0
0.2
99.8
0
100

Fission Rate
(sec-1)
34.5
8600.9
5.5
4589.4
40.66
53026
14.3
6515.5
84634

Total Number
of Source
Fissions
2.00E+07
3.00E+07
3.00E+07
4.00E+06
1.00E+08
1.00E+07
3.00E+07
3.00E+07
1.00E+06

By dividing the total number of source fissions by the fission rate, the total counting time
can be determined. By dividing the total counts by this total counting time, the count
rates can be determined. As demonstrated by the results, with increased plutonium
content there is an increased source of neutrons that is proportional to the total mass
deposited. This is expected due to the spontaneous fissions that occur from Pu-240,
which are significantly greater in total emission rate than the U-238 spontaneous fissions
neutrons.
The results from the detector model for the given rates with uncertainties are seen
in Table 9. A plot of the contribution of mass of plutonium to singles and doubles rates is
seen in Figures 10 and 11. The uncertainties are plotted on the figures however the values
are so small that they are not visible. These low uncertainties illustrate that the model has
reached a conclusive results. As fully analog capture was used, these uncertainties also
are representative of the actual detector uncertainties of the detector.
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Table 9- MCNPx Results for Current Density Test Matrix (Table 3)
Run
i-1 & i-2
i-3
i-4 & i-5
i-6
i-7 & i-8
i-9
i-10
i-11
i-12

U Mass
Pu Mass
deposited (g) deposited (g)
5120
1.00E-07
5020
98.3
817
765
6040
5440
2130
2060
1170

1.00E-07
52.6
1.00E-07
608
1.00E-07
74.6
970

Singles Rate ±
Uncertainty (cps)
0.876 ± 0.0012
279 ± 0.279
0.119 ± 0.00015
128 ± 0.40
1.05 ± 0.0006
2010 ± 3.4
0.336 ± 0.00071
195 ± 0.37
3960 ± 19

Doubles Rate ±
Uncertainty (cps)
0.0466 ± 0.00029
20.3 ± 0.079
0.00514 ±
0.000031
7.91 ± 0.0989
0.0577 ± 0.00016
189 ± 1.1
0.016 ± 0.00016
12.8 ± 0.095
544 ± 7.5

Figure 10- Singles Rate vs. Plutonium Mass Deposited For Current Density Test Matrix
as Shown in Table 9

Figure 11- Doubles rate vs. Plutonium Mass Deposited For Current Density Test Matrix
as Shown in Table 9
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Inspecting the data from the tables and figures demonstrates the profound impact
that the presence of plutonium has with regards to overall count rate for the detector.
With increased plutonium deposition, an increased count rate is seen due to increased
mass of Pu-240 and thus an increase in neutron source. For both singles and doubles
rates, a minor deposit of plutonium leads to a significantly larger count rate than the
product that features essentially no plutonium as is the case of normal operation. Most
importantly, the doubles rate is highly distinguishable from the pure uranium case in all
cases that involve plutonium deposition. These two count rates can both serve as
significant signatures for an SBS type application. In addition, the figures demonstrate
that there is a linear relationship between plutonium mass deposited and the counts
registered. In reality, at higher count rates, this relationship would most likely be linear
and the actual registered count rate would be less due to the presence of detector dead
time. Detector dead time was not factored into the analyses carried out in this modeling
work. However, even if dead time was present, the issue of counts as being applied as a
signature would not change as they would still show a significant difference than in the
case of the pure uranium product.
Of the upmost importance for signature identification in SBS, is determining the
signatures associated with specific events or failures. For this type of analysis, the results
of single and double count rates versus current density are seen in Figures 12 and 13.
These results correspond with the failure modes seen in the test matrix in Table 3. As
shown in both figures 12 and 13, the rates increase quadratically with increasing current
density. It stays as a low count value, until it reaches a level above the limiting current
density for a given composition thus leading to an abrupt jump in counts due to
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deposition of plutonium. This shows that current density can change and still produce no
plutonium transport and subsequently counts. This is especially true for cases that involve
low currents or lower plutonium to uranium ratios. However, at higher plutonium to
uranium ratios it is demonstrated that the change in current density and thus surface area
is smaller and thus more sensitive to set off an alarm. Various scenarios could lead to a
higher Pu/U ratio in the salt, including errors in the addition of oxidant, uranium
drawdown, or differing used fuel compositions. In all of these cases, the HLNCC
demonstrates that it can detect changes in actinide content that are a result of changes in
current density. These results demonstrate the potential ability of these signals to be
integrated into an SBS framework and effectively detect and diagnose these off normal
scenarios.

Figure 12- Singles Rate vs. Current Density (Legend: circle -- Pu/U = 0.0309, + -- Pu/U =
0.1493, x -- Pu/U = 0.3392, Three Pronged Symbol -- Pu/U = 1.6382)
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Figure 13- Doubles Rate vs. Current Density (Legend: circle -- Pu/U = 0.0309, + -- Pu/U
= 0.1493, x -- Pu/U = 0.3392, Three Pronged Symbol -- Pu/U = 1.6382)

5.2.2 Diffusion Layer Thickness Study Results

Using the results for the first test matrix for changes in cathode diffusion layer
thickness, the spontaneous fission rate and individual contribution from a given nuclide
could be calculated. The results of these calculations are seen in Table 10. Again it is
demonstrated that with increased plutonium deposition there is an increased source
strength that is proportional to the total mass deposited.
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Table 10- Contribution of Uranium and Plutonium to the Overall Spontaneous Fission
Rates for Diffusion Layer Thickness Test Matrix (Table 4)

Run
δ-1
δ-2
δ-3
δ-4
δ-5
δ-6
δ-7
δ-8
δ-9
δ-10

% Contribution
by U Fissions
100
0.1
0
0
0
100
0.1
0
0
0

%
Contribution
by Pu
Fissions
0
99.9
100
100
100
0
99.9
100
100
100

Fission Rate
(sec-1)
6
32318
52266
72623
90976
10.5
14520
36664
51357
62198

Number of
Source Fissions
2.00E+07
4.00E+06
1.00E+06
1.00E+06
1.00E+06
2.00E+07
4.00E+06
1.00E+06
1.00E+06
1.00E+06

The detector response modeled by MCNP for these cathodic products are shown
in Table 11 and Figures 14 and 15.

Table 11- MCNPx Results for Cathode Diffusion Layer Thickness Text Matrix (Table 4)
Run
δ-1
δ-2
δ-3
δ-4
δ-5
δ-6
δ-7
δ-8
δ-9
δ-10

Applied Current
Density (A/cm2)
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.0275
0.0275
0.0275
0.0275
0.0275

δ(µm)
200
210
220
230
240
150
200
250
300
350

Initial Pu/U
salt mole ratio
0.337
0.337
0.337
0.337
0.337
1.627
1.627
1.627
1.627
1.627
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Singles Rate ±
Uncertainty (cps)
1.26 ± 0.0018
1161 ± 3.1
1966 ± 11
2909 ± 15
3844 ± 20
0.239 ± 0.00036
451 ± 1.3
1331 ± 7.3
2060 ± 11
2712 ± 14

Doubles Rate ±
Uncertainty (cps)
0.071 ±0.0004
98.5 ± 0.95
179 ± 3.26
296 ± 4.94
432 ± 6.78
0.0217 ±0.00015
33 ± 0.36
128 ± 2.32
227 ± 3.70
677 ± 10.0

The change in the singles count rates is linearly proportional to the thickness of
the cathode diffusion layer. At higher current densities, the slope of this line is
greater. Thus in a commercial facility where current is expected to be high as to
maximize transport and throughput, only a slight increase in diffusion layer thickness
due to a reduced rotational speed could generate a singles rate that could potentially
set off an alarm in an SBS integrated system. The doubles rate follows a more
quadratic relationship between count rate and diffusion layer thickness. The doubles
rate is important as they are reflective of the fissile material present and are not as
sensitive to background. Thus, doubles rates have great significance as signatures in
ER product analysis. The doubles rates at lower current densities will be harder to
detect for slight changes as the effect on doubles count rates due to changes in
diffusion layer thicknesses is lower at lower diffusion layer thicknesses. However, at
higher current densities, the coincidence counter can be used as an effective tool for
detecting signatures of off normal operations.

Figure 14- Singles Rate vs. Diffusion Layer Thickness (Legend: Circle -- Applied
Current Density = 0.125 A/cm2, + -- Applied Current Density = 0.0275 A/cm2)
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Figure 15- Doubles Rate vs. Diffusion Layer Thickness (Legend: Circle -- Applied
Current Density = 0.125 A/cm2, + -- Applied Current Density = 0.0275 A/cm2)

5.3 MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES
One of the greatest challenges with applying the knowledge obtained from
computer modeling analyses such as these with a real application is the presence of
measurement uncertainties in the counts of the neutron detector. The counts from the
model will be significantly less than that obtained by detectors in a real system. This is
due to multiple reasons. The first is that the measurement uncertainties of detector counts
are equal to the square root of the total counts. Counts are proportional to the time that
the detector is allowed to count the neutrons provided by the ingot. As the number of
source fissions in these analyses is great, the total counting time is also great especially in
the case of the pure uranium product cases where the counting times are on the scales of
hours, days or even weeks. The counting times in an actual pyroprocessing facility due to
the need for high throughputs will posses shorter counting times and thus a higher
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measurement uncertainties for no to low plutonium deposition and thus making the signal
for SBS harder to distinguish as to being within the acceptable range or not. As no
counting times have been determined, an estimate of the quantity of detector uncertainty
of a measurement in an actual facility has yet to be determined. This time however can be
determined through the use of system models of what an efficient pyroprocessing
facilities timing scheme looks like. In addition, this quantification can be aided with
information from the PRIDE facility relating to material throughput and unit operation
time. By scaling up this information, one can determine how much time can possibly be
spent on a given counting measurement without affecting the overall throughput of the
facility.
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6. RESULTS OF CATHODE PROCESSOR FAILURE MODES
In addition to failure modes for the ER, failure modes for the CP were analyzed
for potential signatures to be integrated into an SBS framework. This chapter describes
first the ERAD and SOURCES-4C results and second the results obtained from the
MCNP analysis for the developed test matrix[41].

6.1 ERAD AND SOURCES-4C RESULTS
The study in ERAD for the CP failure modes involved using runs 1, 4, 7, and 10
from the current density text matrix as they were representative of circumstances where
the ER operated without the presence of any failure mode. This would result in the
deposition of only uranium at the cathode. The results of these runs as well as the results
for the source strength of these compositions from SOURCES-4C are shown in Table 12.
It was found that after one 12 hour operation of the ER that the change in composition of
the ER salt was negligible. Thus, the listed initial weight percentages are also the end of
operation weight percentages. This is important to note, as it emphasizes the importance
of constant monitoring of signals and processes as the saturation of the salt with actinides
will require time and continual operation.
Table 12- Calculated Source from SOURCES-4C
Case
#
1
4
7
10

U wt% in Pu wt% in U Cathode
Alpha-n Source
SF Source
Salt
Salt
Mass
(n/cm^3-s)
(n/cm^3-s)
7.57
0.234
5120
29.27
2.998
1.57
0.234
817
30.5
2.997
7.57
2.57
6040
329.2
32.92
1.57
2.57
2130
331.2
32.92
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6.2 MCNP MODEL RESULTS
The results of the MCNP detector model for singles and doubles rates versus
weight percentage of salt left entrained in the ingot is seen in Figures 16 and 17. In both
cases there is a linear relationship between weight percentage of salt entrained and the
count rate registered. In addition, there was a greater ratio of singles rate to doubles rate
compared to results seen for cases for the ER failure modes. This is due to the primary
neutron source within the detector being due to alpha-n reactions, which do not emit
multiple neutrons, do not induce as many fissions, and the neutrons released are of a
lower energy. The lower energy neutrons emitted are absorbed more often in the
cadmium liner, which is a strong absorber of epithermal neutrons.

Figure 16- Result of MCNP6 Coincidence Counting Tallies for Singles Rate for CP
Failure Modes
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Figure 17- Result of MCNP6 Coincidence Counting Tallies for Doubles Rate for CP
Failure Modes

Comparing between the different cases, the salts with the higher weight
percentage of plutonium, case 7 and 10, are significantly greater in terms of produced
count rate than those with less. This is due to the greater number of spontaneous fissions
and alpha-n reactions as a result of the increased plutonium and the curium content ,
which are much more active species than uranium. This produces a greater source of
neutrons and thus more neutrons to be counted in a given period of time. Also, comparing
between cases of the same weight percentages of plutonium, the ingots that have the most
uranium mass register the highest counts as this provides the greatest mass of salt
entrained and thus greatest source. In addition, greater uranium mass also means that
there is more fissile material that the source from the salt can induce fissions in.
Examining the error bars, there is a greater error in the results of the case of
higher weight percentages for the same number of source fissions and alpha-n source
neutrons. These error bars represent the measurement uncertainty of the detector. This
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increased measurement uncertainty is due to there being a fewer fission in the uranium
ingot because the salt layer is larger and thus the distance to travel between salt layer and
ingot is increased. For this reason, fewer counts occur over a given number of source
particles run. However, as the count rates are significantly higher, in an actual counting
situation the time required to attain a low uncertainty measurement would be less. Thus
in an actual safeguards measurement, these counts would be registered with lower
uncertainties and thus be more conclusive signatures.
The results of these simulations demonstrate that signatures do exist for counting
measurements of ingots with salt entrained. However, for low plutonium content, we see
a significantly lower count rate especially at lower weight percentages of total salt
entrained. In addition, the doubles rate is especially low and would be difficult to register
to obtain a high confidence rate to be utilized for a signature for any weight percentage of
salt entrained. The singles rate could still potentially be a signature. For this reason,
though it was applicable as an instrument for registering counting signatures for ER
failure modes, the JCC-31 may not be the most applicable NDA tool for the purposes of
identifying signatures for integration into an SBS framework as it may not be able to
sufficiently monitor all failure modes that affect the final ingot. Thus, other NDA
techniques and devices should be investigated in the future to determine if there are ones
that are more effective for this purpose and can either be used in conjunction with the
JCC-31 or be a replacement for use in an SBS system. This future investigation could
involve additional neutron detection methods or gamma measurements. The JCC-31,
despite this, if coupled with high confidence measurements like density measurements
and visual inspection could still be effective as a signature identification tool.
62

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
NMA face several challenges when applied to reprocessing. Electrochemical
reprocessing or pyroprocessing in particular faces many challenges using NMA due to
the lack of an upfront input accountability tank and inconvenient and unrealistic plant
flushouts. Thus, alternate methods for safeguarding pyroprocessing using PM to aid and
decrease the uncertainty of normal NMA measurements are being investigated. One PM
method of particular interest with demonstrated efficacy is the Signature Based
Safeguards (SBS) approach. SBS involves determining signatures that indicate that off
normal operations are occurring and integrating data from sensors within a
pyroprocessing facility to raise an alarm if anomalous operations are occurring. This
allows detection to occur in real time and not just at the end of cycle NMA audit.
One challenge faced in safeguarding pyroprocessing is failure modes within plant
operations that would appear to be malicious diversions. Work to determine signatures
that indicate these failure modes is important to successfully operating and safeguarding
an advanced fuel cycle facility. The work undertaken for this thesis involved identifying
failure modes and investigating their signatures.
The first step in performing this was determining failure modes for the ER and CP
process equipment. These failure modes then needed to be simulated to determine
signatures that would arise. This was done by coupling an ER model in a computer code
known as ERAD and an NDA instrument known as the JCC-31 HLNCC in MCNP. To
couple the two, the failure modes for the ER were simulated in ERAD by changing their
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inputs. After simulating these failure modes, the output of ERAD was consolidated into
an ingot that was analyzed for both singles and double coincidence rates in MCNP.
A qualitative analysis of the results simulated in the modeled analyses are
tabulated in Table 13 for a given failure mode with respect to their overall safeguards
significance and potential detectability by the sensors within a SBS framework. Each
failure mode is ranked as to both their significance and detectability being high, medium,
or low. The safeguards significance reflects the failure modes to produce a loss of COK.
The detectability reflects the amount that the results diverge from the normal operating
state and the number of sensors that can detect it.

Table 13- Qualitative Summary of Failure Mode’s Safeguard Significance and
Detectability (Ranked: H-High, M-Medium, L-Low)
Failure Mode Identified

Safeguard Significance

Detectability

ER Failure Modes
Poorly Characterized Anodic Feedstock

L

L

Change in Electrode Submersion Depth

M

M

Change in Electrode Rotational Speed

H

H

CP Failure Modes
Poorly Characterized CP Feedstock

M

L

Temperature Variation of CP

L

M

Pressure Variation of CP

L

M
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The conclusions of the ER failure modes demonstrate that there is a certain level
of hierarchy with regards to the safeguards significance of a failure mode. Poorly
characterized anodic feedstock is of low safeguards significance due to it not being the
primary reason for the deposition of material in the cathode that could produce a
safeguard relevant scenario. It only decides the ratio of uranium to plutonium in the
combined metal. The safeguard significance of the change in electrode submersion depth
is ranked as medium as it contributes directly to the deposition of plutonium at the
cathode; however, there is a significant operational range under, which deposition will
not occur even though it is not operating as designed. The significance of the electrode
rotational speed is classified as high due to the deposition of plutonium of occurring with
only slight changes in diffusion layer thickness and thus small changes in rotational speed
thus causing a potential loss of COK. The detectability of the poorly characterized
feedstock is low as there are no corroborating sensors along with a radiation detector that
can indicate that the feedstock possesses a certain level of safeguards significance. The
detectability of change in submersion depth is classified as medium as sensors of the both
the reference electrode and radiation detector can only detect and determine it in the cases
in , which the submersion depth changes significantly enough to deposit plutonium. Only
a sensor determining electrode depth would be able to notice the failure mode if it does
not result in deposition. Finally, the detectability of the change in rotational speed is high
as the sensors, RPM meter, reference electrode, and radiation detector all can realize and
detect the slight changes that lead to deposition when outputs are combined together.
For the CP failure modes, the safeguard significance of poorly characterized CP
feedstock is categorized as medium. This is due to it being the deciding factor as to the
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amount of plutonium that can remain if a failure mode occurs or plutonium chloride
reacts with uranium. The failure modes of temperature variation and pressure variation
are labeled as low safeguards significance, as the failure has to be significant enough to
generate a large amount of residual salt or else the amount of plutonium that remains is
very low and of little interest from a COK perspective. The detectability of poorly
characterized feedstock is labeled as low as the radiation detector outputs are low and this
is the only way of seeing that a failure mode has occurred in this fashion. The
detectability of the mode of temperature and pressure variations are labeled as medium,
as, even though the radiation detector is not a very good sensor for detecting this
anomaly, the other sensors such as pressure gauges and thermocouples will most likely be
able to detect a change in operating conditions.
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APPENDIX A- SAMPLE ERAD SCRIPT
Stage 1 - Continuous electrorefining, uranium extraction: RB 02.11.2009
&input1
!Temperature (keep at 773 Kelvin unless other parameters are
changed accordingly)
temp=773.d0,
!Number of elements being tracked in the system
nelemt=10,
!Elemtn names (not used, but useful in remembering)
ename = 'Ur', 'Pu', 'Nd', 'Cd', 'Li', 'Ka', 'Cl', 'Np', 'Na',
'Zr',
!Standard potentials for each elements (Reverse of conventional
sign)
! stde = 2.501d0, 2.76d0, 0.36d0, 0.635d0, 3.683d0, 3.865d0,
-0.895d0, 9.68d0,9.5d0,2.2,
stde = 1.113d0, 1.372d0, 0.36d0, 0.635d0, 3.683d0, 3.865d0,
-0.895d0, 9.68d0,9.5d0,0.81,
!taken from CV paper and from (zr needs updated)
!Diffusion coefficients in liquid cadmium
diffu1= 1.51d-5, 1.0d-5, 1.5d-9, 1.5d-5, 1.5d-5, 1.5d-5,
1.5d-5, 1.5d-9, 1.5d-9,1.d-5,
!Estimated
!Diffusion coefficients in molten salt
diffu2= 2.E-05, 8d-5, 1d-5, 2.23d-5, 1.13d-5, 2.5d-5, 2.5d-5,
1d-9, 1d-9, 1.5d-5,
!Taken from cv paper and from australian paper
!Standard exchange current densities (A/cm^2)
curr0 = 1E-00, 0.8, 5d-9, 5d-9, 5d-9, 5d-9, 5d-9, 5d-9, 5d-9,
.8d-0
!Taken from cv paper and zr guessed
!Species valance states
zi
= 3.000d0, 3.0d0, 3.0d0, 2.00d0, 1.0d0, 1.0d0, -1.0d0,
3.0d0,1.0d0,4.0d0, !X!
!Transfer coefficient for anode (alpha)
tca
= 5.0E-01, 0.5d0, 0.5d0, 0.50d0, 0.5d0, 0.5d0,
0.5d0,0.5d0,0.5d0,0.5d0,
!X!
!Transfer coefficient for cathode (alpha)
tcc
= 5.0E-01, 0.5d0, 0.5d0, 0.5d0, 0.5d0, 0.5d0, 0.5d0,
0.5d0, 0.5d0, 0.5d0, !X!
!initial cathode potential (Volts) [-0.5 to -3.0]
catp=-2.7d0, !X!
!initial anode potential (Volts) [-0.5 to -3.0]
anop=-2.5d0, !X!
!Number of current 'steps';
ipset=1, !x!
!End time of current 'steps' (hours)
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tset= 6.02 !X!
!Current setting for each current 'step' (Amps)
cmaxt= 0.4d0 !X!
!Absolute error for Butler-Volmer Solver (recomended: less than
1d-16)
aberr=1.d-15,
!Solubility limit for elements in Cadmium pool (mole fraction)
psolim = 0.0113d-2, 0.018d-2, 1.0d0, 1.0d0, 1.0d0, 1.0d0,
1.0d0, 1.0d0, 1.0d0, 0.00295d-2
!Cyclic voltammogram option: tmodi = 'cyclic'
! tmodi = 'cyclic'
!CV scan rate (V/s) sign of number indicates starting direction
! sr = -.1
!Cv start voltage, maximum voltage, and minimum voltage
! v = -1.000, -1.35, -1.8
!Output coordinate for first column on tables (mnemonic X
select) 1=coulombs passed, 2=time in seconds, 3=time in hours
xsel = 1
!Period between major outputs such as (plots of diffusion
layers) unit selected by xsel
outperiod = 100.
!Supress CV output before tcrit
osupress = .False.
!Add column headings to output
colheading = .TRUE.
!.TRUE.=Write cathode contents to restart file/ .FALSE. Write
original cathode contents to restart file
writecathode = .TRUE.
!Used to specify plot monitor of bulk compositions and
concentrations 0=Off
plotmonitorcon = 1
!Used to specify to display plot monitor of surface plots 0=Off
plotmonitorsurf = 0
!used to specify which elements to monitor on the monitor plot.
For all element, input " ", example: 'Ur Pu Zr'
!
plotelelist = ' '
plotelelist=" Ur Pu Zr"
/
&sanode
!Type of solid anode (3=cylinder, 2=cylinder with clad)
sflag = 003,
!Number of cells in Zr region
nzr = 40,
!Initial mesh cell size in Zr region
dy2o=1.0d-7,
!Radius of fuel segement
r0 = 0.2855d0, !X! Assumed
!Height of fuel segement
hi0 = 2.640d0, !X! With mass and volume and density
assumptions
!Number of chopped fuel segements
ncfs = 1,
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!Fraction of electrolyte diffusion coefficient in Zr region due
to porous media (normally a guess)
dfrac = .031000d0
!Set initialize to 90232 if you want to skip it
initialize = 90232
slimcon = -00.1
/
&input2
!Size of anodic liquid metal diffusion layer [keep it the size of
1*dy in this code version] (cm)
del(1)=1.0E-03,
!Size of anodic molten salt diffusion layer (cm)
del(2)=15.0E-03
!Size of cathodic molten salt diffusion layer (cm)
del(3)=20.0E-03
!Size of cathodic liquid metal diffusion layer [set to 1*dy if
solid cathode] (cm)
del(4)=1.0E-03
!Mesh Size (cm)
dy=1.0E-03,
!Contact area of anode-salt, cathode-salt, and pool-salt
interfaces (cm^2)
area= 4.73, 45.23d0 !x!
/
&INPUT3
!Solver settings. Don't mess with them unless you edit the
source code.
ISTATE=1,
ITASK=5,
epslon=1.d-5
iopt=1,
!Maximum number of computations per timestep. (Has never helped
the result)
mxstep=100,
!First timestep size (seconds). Keep it small
h0=1d-15
!Keep this set to 5, which tells lsoda to compute a banded
jacobian.
jt=5,
!Matrix lower bandwidth. Its minimum value seems to be 19 when
using 10 elements.
!Smaller=faster bigger->more stable
!Smaller->faster bigger->more stable
ml=99,
!Matrix upper bandwidth. Its minimum value seems to be 19 when
using 10 elements.
mu=99,
!Maximum timestep
hmax=50.0d0
itol=1,
!LSODA/E relative tolerance (I have found it best to keep this
number less than 10d-20, but feel
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!free to play with it)
rtoli=1.d-22
!LSODA/E absolute tolerance (This will likely need adjusting. I
have found it should be less than
!1d-6, and preferably beween 1d-10 and 1d-8. With lsoda, running
smaller that 1d-12 causes the code
!to crash. With lsode, I have not found a lower limit, but would
still reccomend keeping the tolerance
!above 1d-12 for the sake of speed
atoli=1.d-13
iprint=2,
/
&input4
!Composition of anode (weight fraction)
Can= 70d-2, 20d-2, 1.0d-9, 1.0d-9, 1.0d-9, 1.0d-9, 1.0d-9, 1.0d9, 1.0d-19, 10d-2, !X!
!Composition of electrolyte (weight fraction)
Cms= 00.73d-2, 3.10d-2, 1.d-9, 1.d-9, 6.87d-2, 2.78d-1, 6.18d-1,
1d-9, 1d-19, 0.003d-2, !X!
!Composition of cathode (weight fraction)
Cca= 1d-7, 1d-7, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d-19, 1d9, !X!
!Composition of pool (weight fraction)
Cpo= 1d-3, 1d-3, 1d-9, .98d-0, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d-9,
1d-9,
!Composition of pool intermetallics (weight fraction)
Cim= 9d-3, 5d-3, 1d-9, 8d-3, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d-9, 1d9,
!Composition of inlet stream (weight fraction)
Cin= 1.5d-11, 1.0d-11, 1.d-11, 1.d-11, 7.368d-2, 28.842d-2,
63.789-2, 1d-11, 1.52d-11, 1d-11,
/
&input5
!masses of anode, electrolyte, cathode, pool, and pool
precipitate (g)
mass= 9.6d0, 1065d0, 1.0d-2, .6, .2 !X!
!
! if vol specified, volume is used
! if dens specified, volume is calculated via density
dens = 14.2, 1.7813 , -7.8148, 1, 1
! density taken from zr density paper in archives
vol = -0.9295d0, -97.87d0,0.01d0, -42,-1
!Atomic weights of the elements
gatom=238.03, 240.0, 144.24, 112.41, 6.939, 39.1, 35.453,
237.0d0,22.9d0,91.224d0 !x!
/
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APPENDIX B- SAMPLE MCNPX-POLIMI SCRIPT FOR ER FAILURE MODES
Model JCC-31 for High Level Neutron Coincidence Counting
c *******************************
c Cell Cards
c *******************************
100 1000 -19.1 -1 2 -3 imp:n=1 $Uranium Ingot
110 2000 -8.65
-2 4 -7 imp:n=1 $Cadmium SHield
120 3000 -.0013
-1 -5 3 imp:n=1 $ Surrounding Air In Sample
Compartment
130 3000 -.0013
1 -7 2 -5 imp:n=1$ Surrounding Air In Sample
Compartment
140 2000 -8.65
-7 5 -6 imp:n=1 $ Cadmium Shield
150 4000 -0.92
6 -8 -7 imp:n=1 $Poly Reflector
160 5000 8.636e-2 -13 8 -9 imp:n=1 $Stainless Steel Electronics
170 2000 -8.65
7 -11 12 -8 imp:n=1 $Cadmium Shield
180 4000 -0.92
-7 -4 12 imp:n=1 $Poly Reflector
190 4000 -0.92
11 -10 12 -8 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 imp:n=1 $Poly
Reflector
314 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -14 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
315 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -15 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
316 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -16 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
317 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -17 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
318 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -18 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
319 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -19 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
320 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -20 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
321 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -21 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
322 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -22 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
323 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -23 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
324 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -24 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
325 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -25 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
326 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -26 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
327 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -27 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
328 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -28 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
329 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -29 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
330 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -30 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
331 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -31 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
200 2000 -8.65
-13 10 12 -8 imp:n=1 $Cadmium SHield
214 6000 -.0001785 -14 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
215 6000 -.0001785 -15 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
216 6000 -.0001785 -16 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
217 6000 -.0001785 -17 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
218 6000 -.0001785 -18 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
219 6000 -.0001785 -19 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
220 6000 -.0001785 -20 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
221 6000 -.0001785 -21 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
222 6000 -.0001785 -22 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
223 6000 -.0001785 -23 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
224 6000 -.0001785 -24 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
225 6000 -.0001785 -25 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
226 6000 -.0001785 -26 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
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227
228
229
230
231
210

6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
0

-.0001785 -27 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -28 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -29 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -30 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -31 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
13:-12:9 imp:n=0 $Outside World

c *******************************
c Surface Cards Defining Detector
c *******************************
1 cz 2.811
2 pz 0
3 pz 11.242
4 pz -0.04
5 pz 40.6
6 pz 40.64
7 cz 8.5
8 pz 54.85
9 pz 65.85
10 cz 17
11 cz 8.54
12 pz -14.25
13 cz 17.04
14 c/z 11 0 1.27
15 c/z -11 0 1.27
16 c/z 10.3366 3.7622 1.27
17 c/z 8.4625 7.0707 1.27
18 c/z 5.5 9.5263 1.27
19 c/z 1.910 10.8329 1.27
20 c/z -1.910 10.8329 1.27
21 c/z -5.5 9.5263 1.27
22 c/z -8.4265 7.0707 1.27
23 c/z -10.3366 3.7622 1.27
24 c/z -10.3366 -3.7622 1.27
25 c/z -8.4625 -7.0707 1.27
26 c/z -5.5 -9.5623 1.27
27 c/z -1.9101 -10.8329 1.27
28 c/z 1.9101 -10.8329 1.27
29 c/z 5.5 -9.5263 1.27
30 c/z 8.4265 -7.0707 1.27
31 c/z 10.3366 -3.7622 1.27
32 pz 36.55
c *******************************
c Data Cards
c *******************************
c Source Definition
nps 2e7
sdef pos= 0.0 0.0 0.0 axs= 0. 0. 1 rad=d1 ext=d2
si1= 0.0 2.811
sp1= -21 1
si2= 0.0 11.242
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$ erg=d3

sp2= 0 1
c si3= L 2 3 4 5 6 7
c sp3= 9.689e-11 6.6025e-5 1.15499e-6 .971065 2.39294e-2
4.93867e-3
IPOL 2 -1 1 1 0 0 18 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224
225
226 227 228 229 230 231
c *******************************
c Material Definition
c *******************************
m1000
92233
-1.92e-8
$ U/TRU Ingot
92234
-3.65e-4
92235
-9.02e-3
92236
-6.425e-3
92237
-6e-12
92238
-.984
94238
-6.5370e-13
94239
-1.2009e-11
94240
-3.4141e-12
94241
-4.4236e-13
94242
-2.2661e-12
94243
-8.5542e-28
94244
-2.439e-16
m2000
48106
.0125
48108
.0089
48110
.1249
48111
.1280
48112
.2413
48113
.1222
48114
.2873
48116
.0749
m3000 7014.70c
0.8
8016.70c
0.2 $ air
m4000 1001.70c
2.0
6000.70c
1.0
$ polyethylene
mt4000
poly.10t
c STAINLESS-STEEL
c
Cr number density = 1.6540e-2
c
Fe number density = 6.3310e-2
c
Ni number density = 6.5100e-3
c
total number density = 8.6360e-2
c
c
m5000 24050 7.1866e-4
$ Cr-50 4.345%
24052 1.3859e-2
$ Cr-52 83.789%
24053 1.5715e-3
$ Cr-53 9.501%
24054 3.9117e-4
$ Cr-54 2.365%
26054 3.7005e-3
$ Fe-54 5.845%
26056 5.8090e-2
$ Fe-56 91.754%
26057 1.3415e-3
$ Fe-57 2.119%
26058 1.7853e-4
$ Fe-58 0.282%
28058 4.4318e-3
$ Ni-58 68.0769%
28060 1.7071e-3
$ Ni-60 26.2231%
28061 7.4207e-5
$ Ni-61 1.1399%
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28062 2.3661e-4
$ Ni-62 3.6345%
28064 6.0256e-5
$ Ni-64 0.9256%
m6000 2003 1.0
$Helium 3
f8:n (214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228
229 230 231)
c fm4 1 6000 1
c sd4 1
ft8:n cap 2003 gate 400 6400
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APPENDIX C- SAMPLE MCNP6 SCRIPT FOR ALPHA-N NEUTRON SOURCE FOR CP
FAILURE MODES
Model JCC-31 for High Level Neutron Coincidence Counting
c *******************************
c Cell Cards
c *******************************
100 1000 -19.1 -1 2 -3 imp:n=1 $Uranium Ingot
101 7000 -1.24 -1 3 -99 imp:n=1 $Salt Entrained
110 2000 -8.65
-2 4 -7 imp:n=1 $Cadmium SHield
120 3000 -.0013
-1 -5 99 imp:n=1 $ Surrounding Air In Sample
Compartment
130 3000 -.0013
1 -7 2 -5 imp:n=1$ Surrounding Air In Sample
Compartment
140 2000 -8.65
-7 5 -6 imp:n=1 $ Cadmium Shield
150 4000 -0.92
6 -8 -7 imp:n=1 $Poly Reflector
160 5000 8.636e-2 -13 8 -9 imp:n=1 $Stainless Steel Electronics
170 2000 -8.65
7 -11 12 -8 imp:n=1 $Cadmium Shield
180 4000 -0.92
-7 -4 12 imp:n=1 $Poly Reflector
190 4000 -0.92
11 -10 12 -8 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 imp:n=1 $Poly
Reflector
314 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -14 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
315 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -15 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
316 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -16 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
317 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -17 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
318 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -18 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
319 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -19 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
320 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -20 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
321 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -21 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
322 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -22 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
323 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -23 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
324 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -24 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
325 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -25 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
326 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -26 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
327 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -27 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
328 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -28 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
329 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -29 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
330 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -30 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
331 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -31 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
200 2000 -8.65
-13 10 12 -8 imp:n=1 $Cadmium SHield
214 6000 -.0001785 -14 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
215 6000 -.0001785 -15 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
216 6000 -.0001785 -16 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
217 6000 -.0001785 -17 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
218 6000 -.0001785 -18 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
219 6000 -.0001785 -19 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
220 6000 -.0001785 -20 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
221 6000 -.0001785 -21 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
222 6000 -.0001785 -22 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
223 6000 -.0001785 -23 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
224 6000 -.0001785 -24 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
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225
226
227
228
229
230
231
210

6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
0

-.0001785 -25 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -26 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -27 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -28 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -29 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -30 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -31 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
13:-12:9 imp:n=0 $Outside World

c *******************************
c Surface Cards Defining Detector
c *******************************
1 cz 2.7734
2 pz 0
3 pz 11.0935
4 pz -0.04
5 pz 40.6
6 pz 40.64
7 cz 8.5
8 pz 54.85
9 pz 65.85
10 cz 17
11 cz 8.54
12 pz -14.25
13 cz 17.04
14 c/z 11 0 1.27
15 c/z -11 0 1.27
16 c/z 10.3366 3.7622 1.27
17 c/z 8.4625 7.0707 1.27
18 c/z 5.5 9.5263 1.27
19 c/z 1.910 10.8329 1.27
20 c/z -1.910 10.8329 1.27
21 c/z -5.5 9.5263 1.27
22 c/z -8.4265 7.0707 1.27
23 c/z -10.3366 3.7622 1.27
24 c/z -10.3366 -3.7622 1.27
25 c/z -8.4625 -7.0707 1.27
26 c/z -5.5 -9.5623 1.27
27 c/z -1.9101 -10.8329 1.27
28 c/z 1.9101 -10.8329 1.27
29 c/z 5.5 -9.5263 1.27
30 c/z 8.4265 -7.0707 1.27
31 c/z 10.3366 -3.7622 1.27
32 pz 36.55
99 pz 11.26455
c *******************************
c Data Cards
c *******************************
c Source Definition
mode n
nps 23626885
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sdef pos= 0.0 0.0 11.0935 par=n axs= 0. 0. 1 rad=d1 ext=d2 erg=d3
si1= 0.0 2.77374
sp1= -21 1
si2= 0.0 .171047
sp2= 0 1
si3 H 0.0e0 2.5e-1 5.0e-1 7.5e-1 1.0e0
1.25e0 1.5e0 1.75e0 2.0e0 2.25e0
2.5e0 2.75e0 3.0e0 3.25e0 3.5e0
3.75e0 4.0e0 4.25e0 4.5e0 4.75e0
5.0e0 5.25e0 5.5e0 5.75e0 6.0e0 6.25e0
6.5e0 6.75e0 7.0e0 7.25e0 7.5e0 7.75e0
8.0e0 8.25e0 8.5e0 8.75e0 9.0e0
9.25e0 9.5e0 9.750e0 1.00e1
sp3 D 0 1.556e-1 1.980e-1 2.215e-1 2.123e-1 1.179e-1
3.586e-2 1.255e-2 7.672e-3 5.505e-3 4.789e-3
4.202e-3 3.659e-3 3.166e-3 2.724e-3
2.331e-3 1.986e-3 1.686e-3 1.425e-3
1.201e-3 1.009e-3 8.450e-4 7.060e-4
5.884e-4 4.893e-4 4.060e-4 3.363e-4
2.780e-4 2.294e-4 1.890e-4 1.555e-4
1.277e-4 1.048e-4 8.584e-5
7.024e-5 5.740e-5 4.686e-5
3.821e-5 3.113e-5 2.533e-5 2.060e-5
c si3= L 2 3 4 5 6 7
c sp3= 9.689e-11 6.6025e-5 1.15499e-6 .971065 2.39294e-2
4.93867e-3
c IPOL 2 -1 1 1 0 0 18 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223
224 225
c
226 227 228 229 230 231
c *******************************
c Material Definition
c *******************************
m1000
92233
-1.92e-8
$ U/TRU Ingot
92234
-3.65e-4
92235
-9.02e-3
92236
-6.425e-3
92237
-6e-12
92238
-.984
94238
-6.80e-13
94239
-1.25e-11
94240
-3.55e-12
94241
-4.41e-13
94242
-2.36e-12
94243
-8.91e-28
94244
-2.54e-16
m2000
48106
.0125
48108
.0089
48110
.1249
48111
.1280
48112
.2413
48113
.1222
48114
.2873
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48116
.0749
m3000 7014.70c
0.8
m4000 1001.70c
2.0
mt4000
poly.10t
c STAINLESS-STEEL
c
Cr number density
c
Fe number density
c
Ni number density
c
total number density
c
c
m5000 24050 7.1866e-4
24052 1.3859e-2
24053 1.5715e-3
24054 3.9117e-4
26054 3.7005e-3
26056 5.8090e-2
26057 1.3415e-3
26058 1.7853e-4
28058 4.4318e-3
28060 1.7071e-3
28061 7.4207e-5
28062 2.3661e-4
28064 6.0256e-5
m6000 2003 1.0
m7000 3006 .0182
3007 .224
19039 .161
19040 2.07e-5
19041 .0116
17035 .410
17037 .131
11023 .0218
92233 1.01e-10
92234 2.87e-6
92235 8.56e-5
92236 6.08e-5
92237 1.89e-13
92238 .00924
94238 1.16e-5
94239 .000175
94240 .0000487
94241 .0000204
94242 .000326
94243 1.22e-20
94244 3.48e-9
96241 1.3e-11
96242 1.45e-9
96243 9.80e-8
96244 1.23e-8
96245 1.66e-9
96246 2.15e-11

8016.70c
6000.70c
=
=
=
=

0.2
1.0

1.6540e-2
6.3310e-2
6.5100e-3
8.6360e-2
$ Cr-50 4.345%
$ Cr-52 83.789%
$ Cr-53 9.501%
$ Cr-54 2.365%
$ Fe-54 5.845%
$ Fe-56 91.754%
$ Fe-57 2.119%
$ Fe-58 0.282%
$ Ni-58 68.0769%
$ Ni-60 26.2231%
$ Ni-61 1.1399%
$ Ni-62 3.6345%
$ Ni-64 0.9256%
$Helium 3
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$ air
$ polyethylene

96248 1.57e-12
f8:n (214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228
229 230 231)
c fm4 1 6000 1
c sd4 1
ft8:n cap 2003 gate 400 6400
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APPENDIX D- SAMPLE SCRIPT FOR MCNP6 FOR SPONTANEOUS FISSION SOURCE
FOR CP FAILURE MODES
Model JCC-31 for High Level Neutron Coincidence Counting
c *******************************
c Cell Cards
c *******************************
100 1000 -19.1 -1 2 -3 imp:n=1 $Uranium Ingot
101 7000 -1.24 -1 3 -99 imp:n=1 $Salt Entrained
110 2000 -8.65
-2 4 -7 imp:n=1 $Cadmium SHield
120 3000 -.0013
-1 -5 99 imp:n=1 $ Surrounding Air In Sample
Compartment
130 3000 -.0013
1 -7 2 -5 imp:n=1$ Surrounding Air In Sample
Compartment
140 2000 -8.65
-7 5 -6 imp:n=1 $ Cadmium Shield
150 4000 -0.92
6 -8 -7 imp:n=1 $Poly Reflector
160 5000 8.636e-2 -13 8 -9 imp:n=1 $Stainless Steel Electronics
170 2000 -8.65
7 -11 12 -8 imp:n=1 $Cadmium Shield
180 4000 -0.92
-7 -4 12 imp:n=1 $Poly Reflector
190 4000 -0.92
11 -10 12 -8 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 imp:n=1 $Poly
Reflector
314 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -14 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
315 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -15 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
316 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -16 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
317 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -17 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
318 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -18 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
319 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -19 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
320 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -20 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
321 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -21 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
322 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -22 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
323 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -23 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
324 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -24 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
325 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -25 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
326 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -26 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
327 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -27 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
328 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -28 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
329 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -29 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
330 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -30 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
331 4000 -0.92
32 -8 -31 imp:n=1
$Poly Reflector
200 2000 -8.65
-13 10 12 -8 imp:n=1 $Cadmium SHield
214 6000 -.0001785 -14 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
215 6000 -.0001785 -15 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
216 6000 -.0001785 -16 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
217 6000 -.0001785 -17 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
218 6000 -.0001785 -18 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
219 6000 -.0001785 -19 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
220 6000 -.0001785 -20 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
221 6000 -.0001785 -21 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
222 6000 -.0001785 -22 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
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223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
210

6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
6000
0

-.0001785 -23 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -24 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -25 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -26 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -27 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -28 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -29 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -30 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
-.0001785 -31 12 -32 imp:n=1 $He-3 Detector
13:-12:9 imp:n=0 $Outside World

c *******************************
c Surface Cards Defining Detector
c *******************************
1 cz 2.7734
2 pz 0
3 pz 11.0935
4 pz -0.04
5 pz 40.6
6 pz 40.64
7 cz 8.5
8 pz 54.85
9 pz 65.85
10 cz 17
11 cz 8.54
12 pz -14.25
13 cz 17.04
14 c/z 11 0 1.27
15 c/z -11 0 1.27
16 c/z 10.3366 3.7622 1.27
17 c/z 8.4625 7.0707 1.27
18 c/z 5.5 9.5263 1.27
19 c/z 1.910 10.8329 1.27
20 c/z -1.910 10.8329 1.27
21 c/z -5.5 9.5263 1.27
22 c/z -8.4265 7.0707 1.27
23 c/z -10.3366 3.7622 1.27
24 c/z -10.3366 -3.7622 1.27
25 c/z -8.4625 -7.0707 1.27
26 c/z -5.5 -9.5623 1.27
27 c/z -1.9101 -10.8329 1.27
28 c/z 1.9101 -10.8329 1.27
29 c/z 5.5 -9.5263 1.27
30 c/z 8.4265 -7.0707 1.27
31 c/z 10.3366 -3.7622 1.27
32 pz 36.55
99 pz 11.26455
c
c
c
c

*******************************
Data Cards
*******************************
Source Definition
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mode n
nps 1e6
sdef pos= 0.0 0.0 11.0935 par=sf axs= 0. 0. 1 rad=d1 ext=d2
$erg=d3
si1= 0.0 2.7734
sp1= -21 1
si2= 0.0 .171047
sp2= 0 1
c si3 H 0.0e0 2.5e-1 5.0e-1 7.5e-1 1.0e0
c
1.25e0 1.5e0 1.75e0 2.0e0 2.25e0
c
2.5e0 2.75e0 3.0e0 3.25e0 3.5e0
c
3.75e0 4.0e0 4.25e0 4.5e0 4.75e0
c
5.0e0 5.25e0 5.5e0 5.75e0 6.0e0 6.25e0
c
6.5e0 6.75e0 7.0e0 7.25e0 7.5e0 7.75e0
c
8.0e0 8.25e0 8.5e0 8.75e0 9.0e0
c
9.25e0 9.5e0 9.750e0 1.00e1
c sp3 D 0 1.554e-1 1.977e-1 2.198e-1 2.098e-1 1.173e-1
c
3.643e-2 1.311e-2 8.239e-3 6.018e-3 5.242e-3
c
4.6e-3 4.006e-3 3.466e-3 2.982e-3
c
2.552e-3 2.175e-3 1.845e-3 1.56e-3
c
1.315e-3 1.104e-3 9.252e-4 7.73e-4
c
6.443e-4 5.358e-4 4.446e-4 3.682e-4
c
3.044e-4 2.512e-4 2.070e-4 1.703e-4
c
1.399e-4 1.147e-4 9.4e-5
c
7.691e-5 6.286e-5 5.132e-5
c
4.185e-5 3.409e-5 2.774e-5 2.256e-5
c si3= L 2 3 4 5 6 7
c sp3= 9.689e-11 6.6025e-5 1.15499e-6 .971065 2.39294e-2
4.93867e-3
c IPOL 2 -1 1 1 0 0 18 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223
224 225
c
226 227 228 229 230 231
c *******************************
c Material Definition
c *******************************
m1000
92233
-1.92e-8
$ U/TRU Ingot
92234
-3.65e-4
92235
-9.02e-3
92236
-6.425e-3
92237
-6e-12
92238
-.984
94238
-6.80e-13
94239
-1.25e-11
94240
-3.55e-12
94241
-4.41e-13
94242
-2.36e-12
94243
-8.91e-28
94244
-2.54e-16
m2000
48106
.0125
48108
.0089
48110
.1249
48111
.1280
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48112
.2413
48113
.1222
48114
.2873
48116
.0749
m3000 7014.70c
0.8
m4000 1001.70c
2.0
mt4000
poly.10t
c STAINLESS-STEEL
c
Cr number density
c
Fe number density
c
Ni number density
c
total number density
c
c
m5000 24050 7.1866e-4
24052 1.3859e-2
24053 1.5715e-3
24054 3.9117e-4
26054 3.7005e-3
26056 5.8090e-2
26057 1.3415e-3
26058 1.7853e-4
28058 4.4318e-3
28060 1.7071e-3
28061 7.4207e-5
28062 2.3661e-4
28064 6.0256e-5
m6000 2003 1.0
m7000 3006 .0182
3007 .224
19039 .161
19040 2.07e-5
19041 .0116
17035 .410
17037 .131
11023 .0218
92233 1.01e-10
92234 2.87e-6
92235 8.56e-5
92236 6.08e-5
92237 1.89e-13
92238 .00924
94238 1.16e-5
94239 .000175
94240 .0000487
94241 .0000204
94242 .000326
94243 1.22e-20
94244 3.48e-9
96241 1.3e-11
96242 1.45e-9
96243 9.80e-8

8016.70c
6000.70c
=
=
=
=

0.2
1.0

1.6540e-2
6.3310e-2
6.5100e-3
8.6360e-2
$ Cr-50 4.345%
$ Cr-52 83.789%
$ Cr-53 9.501%
$ Cr-54 2.365%
$ Fe-54 5.845%
$ Fe-56 91.754%
$ Fe-57 2.119%
$ Fe-58 0.282%
$ Ni-58 68.0769%
$ Ni-60 26.2231%
$ Ni-61 1.1399%
$ Ni-62 3.6345%
$ Ni-64 0.9256%
$Helium 3
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$ air
$ polyethylene

96244 1.23e-8
96245 1.66e-9
c
96246 2.15e-11
c
96248 1.57e-12
f8:n (214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228
229 230 231)
c fm4 1 6000 1
c sd4 1
ft8:n cap 2003 gate 400 6400
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